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ABSTRACT 
How should agencies and legislatures evaluate possible policies 
to mitigate the impacts of earthquakes, floods, hurricanes and other 
natural hazards? In particular, should governmental bodies adopt the 
sorts of policy-analytic and risk assessment techniques that are widely 
used in the area of environmental hazards (chemical toxins and 
radiation)? Environmental hazards policy analysis regularly employs 
proxy tests, in particular tests of technological “feasibility,” rather 
than focusing on a policy’s impact on well-being. When human 
welfare does enter the analysis, particular aspects of well-being, such 
as health and safety, are often given priority over others. “Individual 
risk” tests and other features of environmental policy analysis 
sometimes make policy choice fairly insensitive to the size of the 
exposed population. Seemingly arbitrary numerical cutoffs, such as 
the one-in-one million incremental risk level, help structure policy 
evaluation. Risk assessment techniques are often deterministic rather 
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than probabilistic, and in estimating point values often rely on 
“conservative” rather than central-tendency estimates.  
The Article argues that these sorts of features of environmental 
policy analysis may be justifiable, but only on institutional grounds—
if they sufficiently reduce decision costs or bureaucratic error or 
shirking—and should not be reflexively adopted by natural hazards 
policymakers. Absent persuasive institutional justification, natural 
hazards policy analysis should be welfare-focused, multidimensional, 
and sensitive to population size, and natural hazards risk assessment 
techniques should provide information suitable for policy-analytic 
techniques of this sort. 
INTRODUCTION 
How should policy analysis for natural hazards be structured? 
Academics have given relatively little systematic attention to this 
question, by contrast with the question of structuring policy analysis 
for so-called “environmental” hazards (that is, chemical toxins and 
radiation).1 To be sure, scholarly literatures focusing on risk 
assessment and management of certain specific natural hazards are 
well-developed—consider the literatures on flood, hurricane, and 
seismic risks.2 But there is no general paradigm for natural hazards 
risk assessment comparable to the overarching framework for 
environmental risk assessment that the seminal Red Book (1983)3 put 
in place. Since the publication of the Red Book, numerous 
governmental commission reports and academic reports on 
 
 1. The term “environmental risk assessment,” by contrast with “ecological risk 
assessment,” is often used to mean the assessment of health and safety risks posed by toxins and 
radiation. Although this terminology is confusing, it is common in the risk assessment literature. 
See Peter Calow, Environmental Risk Assessment and Management: The Whats, Whys and 
Hows?, in HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT 1–2 (Peter 
Calow ed., 1998). I therefore use “environmental” in this Article as pertaining to toxins and 
radiation, and count FDA, OSHA, and NRC as well as EPA as “environmental” agencies. 
 2. See, e.g., FLOODS AND LANDSLIDES: INTEGRATED RISK ASSESSMENT (Riccardo 
Casale & Claudio Margottini eds., 1999); H. JOHN HEINZ III CTR. FOR SCI., ECON. AND THE 
ENV’T, THE HIDDEN COSTS OF COASTAL HAZARDS: IMPLICATIONS FOR RISK ASSESSMENT 
AND MITIGATION (2000) [hereinafter HIDDEN COSTS]; NAT’L INST. OF BLDG. SCIS., 
ASSESSMENT OF THE STATE OF THE ART EARTHQUAKE LOSS ESTIMATION METHODOLOGIES 
(1993). For a good summary of risk assessment models in these different areas, see Arleen A. 
Hill & Susan L. Cutter, Methods for Determining Disaster Proneness, in AMERICAN 
HAZARDSCAPES: THE REGIONALIZATION OF HAZARDS AND DISASTERS 13 (Susan L. Cutter 
ed., 2001) [hereinafter AMERICAN HAZARDSCAPES]. 
 3. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: 
MANAGING THE PROCESS (1983). 
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environmental risk assessment or management have appeared;4 the 
counterpart literature, which treats natural hazards as a general 
problem for policy analysis, is much smaller.5 
Turning from academic work to governmental practice, there 
certainly are agencies that have well-developed policy-analytic 
protocols for addressing natural hazards—consider the guidance 
documents for evaluating flood reduction measures that the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) has developed over the years.6 But 
expertise in policy analysis varies widely among natural hazards 
agencies. Compare ACE with the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), which has only fairly recently begun to develop risk 
assessment models.7 By contrast, all the leading federal agencies that 
focus on chemical toxins and radiation—the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)—have 
adopted risk assessment as a key component of their decisionmaking.8 
It is interesting to speculate about the reasons for the differential 
development of policy analysis in the environmental and natural 
hazards bureaucracies. The reasons may be in part historical (the 
happenstance of the Red Book’s publication), cultural (the culture of 
science at EPA, and of toxicology at FDA, both of which were 
receptive to risk assessment), or structural (the fact that natural 
hazards policymaking is more highly devolved to the states than 
environmental policymaking; for example, FEMA’s main tool for 
 
 4. Much of this literature is summarized and cited in HUMAN AND ECOLOGICAL RISK 
ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Dennis J. Paustenbach ed., 2002). 
 5. An important exception is DENNIS S. MILETI, DISASTERS BY DESIGN: A 
REASSESSMENT OF NATURAL HAZARDS IN THE UNITED STATES (1999). 
 6. See generally NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., ANALYTICAL METHODS AND APPROACHES FOR 
WATER RESOURCES PROJECT PLANNING (2004) (describing ACE practices); NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, NEW DIRECTIONS IN WATER RESOURCES PLANNING FOR THE U.S. 
ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS (1999) [hereinafter WATER RESOURCES PLANNING] (same); 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ANALYSIS AND UNCERTAINTY IN FLOOD DAMAGE 
REDUCTION STUDIES (2000) [hereinafter FLOOD DAMAGE REDUCTION STUDIES] (same). 
 7. See Robert V. Whitman et al., Development of a National Earthquake Loss Estimation 
Methodology, 13 EARTHQUAKE SPECTRA 643 (1997); HAZUS: FEMA’s Software Program for 
Estimating Potential Losses from Disasters, http://www.fema.gov/plan/prevent/hazus/index.shtm 
(last visited Aug. 24, 2006). 
 8. See Matthew D. Adler, Against “Individual Risk”: A Sympathetic Critique of Risk 
Assessment, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1121, 1148 n.91 (2005). 
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hazards mitigation is the funding of state mitigation plans and 
measures9). 
In any event, academics and policymakers need to engage in 
more sustained discussion about how to evaluate the threats that 
natural hazards pose to human life, health, property, and other 
human interests, and the desirability of governmental policies for 
reducing those threats. Hurricane Katrina, with an estimated $100 
billion in property damage and 1,330 fatalities, underscores the 
importance of the discussion10—as does Katrina’s seismic counterpart, 
the 1995 Kobe earthquake, with an estimated $115 billion in property 
damage and 6,500 deaths.11 But the roughly $10 billion in annual 
property and crop damage (to say nothing of indirect economic 
effects) and hundreds of annual fatalities caused by seismic and 
weather events in the U.S. in the years before Katrina should have 
been sufficient indication of its importance.12 
This Article aims to contribute to that discussion. The particular 
strategy I adopt will be to draw from the U.S. experience with 
environmental hazards policy analysis in suggesting cautionary 
lessons for natural hazards policy analysis. 
It is important to distinguish, at the outset, between policy 
analysis and policy tools. Natural hazards policy tools are the various 
kinds of interventions by which governmental bodies, federal or state, 
can reduce the harms caused by earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, 
tornadoes, and other natural hazards. These include steps such as the 
following: 
• Constructing levees, floodwalls, and dams 
• Incorporating provisions in building codes, for new 
buildings, that reduce the risk of building collapse or other 
damage in the event of earthquakes or hurricanes, or that 
require structures in the floodplain to be sufficiently 
elevated 
 
 9. See DAVID R. GODSCHALK ET AL., NATURAL HAZARD MITIGATION: RECASTING 
DISASTER POLICY AND PLANNING 11–16 (1999). 
 10. WHITE HOUSE, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS 
LEARNED 7–8 (2006). 
 11. See George Horwich, Economic Lessons of the Kobe Earthquake, 48 ECON. DEV. & 
CULTURAL CHANGE 521 (2000). 
 12. See Jerry T. Mitchell & Deborah S.K. Thomas, Trends in Disaster Losses, in 
AMERICAN HAZARDSCAPES, supra note 2, at 77, 79–81. 
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• Reinforcing existing buildings to resist wind and ground 
movement 
• Relocating homes, commercial property, or infrastructure 
away from floodplains and hurricane-prone coastal areas 
• Limiting future construction in these areas through zoning 
• Requiring individuals in high-risk areas to purchase 
insurance, which may help induce them to take individual 
mitigation measures 
• Disseminating information about natural hazard risks and 
countermeasures 
• Temporarily evacuating individuals in advance of a specific 
flood or hurricane 
• Providing emergency food, medical care, shelter, and social 
services to an area hit by an earthquake, flood, hurricane, 
tornado, or other natural hazard.13 
By contrast, policy analysis means the application of some 
decisionmaking technique for choosing among policy tools. Cost-
benefit analysis is one policy-analytic technique. A different 
technique is to choose the policy that involves the lowest risk of 
premature death for some individual (for example, the average 
individual) from some particular risk source (for example, a particular 
toxin or natural hazard). A third technique is to consider only policies 
that are technologically “feasible” or “practicable,” and within this set 
consider the policy that involves the lowest risk of premature death 
for some individual from some particular risk source. This is an 
illustrative, not exhaustive, list. 
The chief policy tools for reducing the harms caused by chemical 
toxins and radiation—for example, reducing industrial emissions of 
air and water pollutants, requiring workers to wear protective gear, 
cleaning up waste dumps, limiting the use of pesticides, or regulating 
food additives—are, clearly, quite different from the policy tools for 
reducing the harms caused by natural hazards. By contrast, policy-
analytic techniques are (at least to some substantial extent) 
translatable from the environmental to the natural hazards domain. 
It is therefore natural to ask: what lessons can be drawn for the 
(less developed) field of natural hazards policy analysis from the 
(more developed) field of environmental policy analysis? This Article 
addresses that question, focusing on major cautionary lessons. What 
 
 13. See MILETI, supra note 5, at 155–240. 
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are the recurrent features of existing environmental policy analysis 
that are (or may well be) problematic, and that natural hazards 
agencies should hesitate to incorporate into their choice procedures?14 
My focus on large and cautionary lessons is a heuristic device, 
designed to structure the learning exercise. There are many 
nonproblematic features of environmental policy analysis that natural 
hazards agencies should duplicate, and many small mistakes that can 
be avoided; but a list of all the lessons, positive and negative, large 
and small, that can be gleaned from the history of policy analysis at 
EPA, FDA, OSHA, and NRC would be overwhelming. I therefore 
train my attention on the major cautionary lessons. 
Some commentators are opposed to the very enterprise of 
rigorous policy analysis.15 That is not my view. Environmental 
agencies are to be applauded for developing a large and integrated set 
of protocols for making a range of difficult policy decisions in the 
teeth of great uncertainty. This is a genuine accomplishment in good 
governance, which should be emulated by federal agencies such as 
FEMA and ACE and by state agencies in California,16 Florida, and 
elsewhere that address natural hazards. My heuristic focus on the 
imperfections of the environmental agencies’ protocols is certainly 
not meant to suggest that environmental policy analysis has generally 
been a failure, or that natural hazards agencies should eschew the use 
of systematic choice procedures. 
Nontrivial normative advice about policy matters is invariably 
somewhat controversial. I do not pretend that my recommendations 
for policy analysis are robust across all plausible moral views. 
Searching for a true “overlapping consensus,” here, is a quixotic 
enterprise. On the other hand, giving useful advice does not entail 
adopting some fully specified and therefore highly controversial 
moral view. My general moral framework for this Article, one that I 
 
 14. I frame the question in terms of features of environmental policy analysis that “may 
be” problematic, and that natural hazards agencies should hesitate to incorporate, because (as 
shall emerge from the discussion below), the central lesson that emerges from a review of 
environmental policy-analytic practice is a qualified one. Proxy criteria, criteria that give 
especial weight to some aspect of well-being, and simplified techniques for risk assessment may 
be justified, but only on institutional grounds. In particular, see infra text accompanying notes 
36–39. 
 15. See Adler, supra note 8, at 1132 n.39 (citing sources). 
 16. See GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERVS., STATE OF CALIFORNIA MULTI 
HAZARD MITIGATION PLAN (2004), available at http://www.oes.ca.gov (follow “Hazard 
Mitigation” hyperlink; then follow “State Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan” hyperlink). 
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have adopted in other work, is “weak welfarism.”17 Weak welfarism is 
a pluralistic framework that recognizes overall well-being as a morally 
relevant consideration, but also allows for distributive considerations 
and moral rights. 
More precisely, weak welfarism says that the morally justifiable 
choice in any governmental choice situation is a function of a possible 
plurality of moral factors {W, F1, F2 . . . . . . FM}, where W is overall 
well-being, and M > 0. Utilitarianism is a limiting case of weak 
welfarism. Utilitarians insist that M = 0. But equity-regarding views 
also fall under the rubric of weak welfarism. An equity-regarding 
view has the structure {W, E, . . . }, where W is overall well-being and 
E attends to the distribution of well-being, or of important 
preconditions for well-being, such as income. Finally, “deontological” 
views can be subsumed within this framework. These views posit 
various moral rights—such as the right not to be killed, or perhaps the 
right not to be put at risk of death—that constrain government’s 
pursuit of overall well-being or the equalization of well-being.18 
The framework of weak welfarism will generate prescriptions for 
policy analysis that are relatively uncontroversial—prescriptions 
which should be accepted by anyone holding a more specific moral 
view subsumable within this framework. 
The existing scholarship on environmental policymaking often 
draws a sharp distinction between “risk management” (a somewhat 
confusing term for what I am calling policy analysis) and “risk 
assessment.”19 A policy-analytic technique structures governmental 
officials’ deliberations. Risk assessment is not itself a policy-analytic 
technique. Rather, it is a characterization of the effect of 
environmental or natural hazards on human life or health, or other 
 
 17. See MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS 25–61 (2006). 
 18. Weak welfarism also subsumes intrinsicalist environmental views, which see 
environmental degradation as morally problematic independent of any effect on the well-being 
of humans or other individual entities (such as certain animals) that possess a well-being. For 
simplicity, I ignore intrinsicalist environmental views. Those views posit an environmental factor 
F* that (by definition) is not sensitive to well-being. F* alone would not support the general 
theme pressed in this Article: that policy analysis should, at some level, be welfare-focused, 
attend to the plurality of welfare dimensions (multidimensionality), and be sensitive to 
population size. Still, it is implausible that F* would be the sole morally relevant factor. A 
plausible specification of weak welfarism would surely include overall well-being, equity, or 
rights along with F*; and those constructs do support the general theme, as fleshed out below. 
 19. See, e.g., Dennis J. Paustenbach, Primer on Human and Environmental Risk 
Assessment, in HUMAN AND ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 4, at 5–7. 
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human interests, which functions as an input to certain policy-analytic 
techniques. Cost-benefit analysis is a policy-analytic technique that 
requires a risk assessment. By contrast, the procedure of reducing 
toxins to the lowest level technologically feasible does not require a 
risk assessment. This procedure necessitates a quantification of the 
toxin levels associated with different policy choices, and a 
determination of the feasibility of those levels, but it does not need to 
quantify the deaths or death risks associated with the different 
choices. 
The structure of my analysis will track the standard distinction 
between “risk management” and “risk assessment.” Part I of the 
Article discusses policy analysis proper. Part II discusses risk 
assessment. First, what are the major cautionary lessons for natural 
hazards policy analysis that can be gleaned from the environmental 
policy analogue? Second, what are the major cautionary lessons for 
the practice of risk assessment? 
I.  POLICY ANALYSIS 
Section 112 of the Clean Air Act,20 which governs certain air 
pollutants, illustrates some of the major features of environmental 
policy analysis as currently practiced in the U.S. EPA is required to 
set an initial emissions level for covered pollutants by considering 
technological feasibility as well as the cost of reducing emissions. At a 
minimum, for new sources in a given source category, the emissions 
level cannot be higher than “the emission control that is achieved in 
practice by the best controlled similar source”; a minimum reduction 
for existing sources is similarly set by reference to current pollution 
control practices.21 Then, within a set period of time after the 
establishment of this initial level, EPA is required to consider 
establishing a lower level if the incremental lifetime cancer risk to the 
maximally exposed individual exceeds one in one million (the “trigger 
provision”).22 
Note how this structure for EPA decisionmaking prioritizes 
safety over other human interests: it is a one in one million fatality 
risk, not property damage or other nonsafety effects of pollution, that 
 
 20. Clean Air Act § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2000). 
 21. § 7412(d)(3). These are the requirements for “major” sources, as opposed to “area” 
sources. See § 7412(d)(5). 
 22. For a more detailed discussion of section 112 of the Clean Air Act, see Adler, supra 
note 8, at 1150–52, and the sources cited at 1150 n.96. 
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is supposed to prompt EPA to consider revising the initial emissions 
level.23 Note, too, how the structure incorporates a proxy test. EPA is 
not told to set the emissions level by maximizing safety, or by 
balancing all aspects of human well-being as per cost-benefit analysis; 
instead, the test of technological feasibility (meaning, in this case, 
both physical achievability and existing practices24) is an important 
ingredient in determining how stringently the pollutant should be 
regulated. Further, observe that the trigger provision in section 112 
uses a non-zero numerical cutoff. Why a one in one million risk to the 
maximally exposed individual? Why not a one in one hundred 
thousand risk? Or a zero risk? Observe, finally, that section 112’s 
trigger provision does not depend on the size of the population 
exposed to the pollutant. The provision is defined in terms of the risk 
to the maximally exposed individual, not the number of expected 
deaths from the pollutant. Doubling or quadrupling the exposed 
population will not affect whether the trigger provision comes into 
play.25 
Each of these aspects of section 112—the prioritization of safety, 
the use of technology-based proxies, insensitivity to population size, 
and the use of non-zero risk cutoffs—is widespread in environmental 
policy. And each grounds a cautionary lesson for natural hazards 
policymakers. 
 
 23. Technically, the trigger provision is embedded in a broader provision, § 7412(f)(2)(A), 
that instructs EPA to revise the technology-based standards under § 7412(d) if necessary either 
to “provide an ample margin of safety to protect public health” or “to prevent, taking into 
consideration costs, energy, safety, and other relevant factors, an adverse environmental effect.” 
However, this general provision is supplemented by the trigger provision, which provides a 
more specific condition under which EPA is required to consider lowering the technology-based 
limits and is defined solely in terms of safety—the risk to the maximally exposed individual.  
§ 7412(f)(2)(A). 
 24. On the different meanings of technological feasibility, see ADLER & POSNER, supra 
note 17, at 75, 91; see also infra text accompanying notes 50–52. 
 25. The trigger provision is not a substantive provision. If triggered, it requires EPA to 
consider lowering the emission level; but section 112 does not clearly specify what substantive 
test EPA should use at that point. EPA, in fact, employs a population-size-sensitive test. See 
Adler, supra note 8, at 1151–52 & n.102; see also National Emission Standards for Hazardous 
Air Pollutants for Organic Hazardous Air Pollutants from the Synthetic Organic Chemical 
Manufacturing Industry, 71 Fed. Reg. 34,422, 34,428 (June 14, 2006). So section 112, as 
interpreted by the EPA, has some elements that are population-size sensitive. But the trigger 
provision itself is not. 
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A. Do Not Give Priority to Safety or Any Particular Aspect of  
Well-Being (AGIR)26 
Environmental policy analysis often prioritizes safety (longevity 
and health) over other aspects of human well-being. The simplest 
example is when the agency employs some kind of safety-
maximization criterion, seeking to minimize the health and longevity 
impacts of a particular toxin. Paradigm cases are the Delaney Clause, 
which requires FDA to refrain from licensing carcinogenic food 
additives, notwithstanding the nutritive or hedonic benefits of those 
additives or, for that matter, their benefits in preventing diseases; the 
general provision for additives, which demands that they be “safe”;27 
and section 109 of the Clean Air Act, which requires EPA to issue 
standards for certain major air pollutants at a level that “protect[s] 
the public health” with an “adequate margin of safety,” 
notwithstanding economic costs.28 
A different kind of prioritization occurs when the policy-analytic 
technique hybridizes safety considerations with other considerations, 
but does so in a way that gives especial weight to safety. For example, 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act instructs OSHA to set a 
standard for workplace toxins at a level which “most adequately 
assures, to the extent feasible, . . . that no employee will suffer 
material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such 
employee has regular exposure to the hazard . . . for the period of his 
working life.”29 A standard way to read this provision is that OSHA 
should maximize safety within the constraints of technical feasibility 
and economic feasibility (in other words, not bankrupting firms).30 
Economic costs are not totally ignored by the test, but they come into 
play only when large enough to trigger bankruptcy; safety is not the 
sole consideration, since it is hedged by technical and economic 
feasibility, but it is more important than economic costs. 
 
 26. “AGIR” stands for “absent good institutional reason.” 
 27. See Adler, supra note 8, at 1164–67 (describing FDA regulation of food and color 
additives, including the Delaney Clause). 
 28. See Clean Air Act § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2000); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 
531 U.S. 457, 465 (2001). 
 29. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2000). 
 30. See David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and Safety 
Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 (2005); Occupational Exposure to 1,3-Butadiene, 61 Fed. Reg. 56,746, 
56,791 (Nov. 4, 1996). 
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The fact that environmental policymakers regularly give priority 
to safety over other human interests (either as a matter of statutory 
requirement, as in the above examples, or as a matter of 
administrative discretion) has been the focus of much scholarly 
criticism—and indeed is worrying from the perspective of weak 
welfarism. Human well-being is multidimensional. Martha Nussbaum 
has defended a plausible list of intrinsic human interests, the basic 
constituents of human welfare, which runs as follows: 
• life 
• bodily health 
• bodily integrity 
• senses, imagination and thought 
• emotions 
• practical reason 
• affiliation 
• other species 
• play 
• control over one’s environment31 
Of course, one might quarrel with the details of Professor 
Nussbaum’s list, and indeed there are various competitor lists in the 
philosophical literature;32 but no plausible list counts longevity and 
health as the sole human interests, or as interests that have a 
categorical (“lexical”) priority over others. 
The multidimensionality of human well-being means, first, that 
policy-analytic techniques designed to identify policies which 
maximize overall well-being should not (bracketing institutional 
considerations) give special priority to safety. And, indeed, cost-
benefit analysis—the standard such technique—incorporates no such 
priority. 
This point is not surprising. More surprising, perhaps, is the claim 
that distributive considerations, too, are multidimensional. 
Egalitarian moral theory remains quite controversial. There are 
continuing disagreements about (1) the “currency” for equity (should 
government aim to equalize welfare, or rather to equalize individuals’ 
“holdings” of certain resources that are preconditions for welfare, 
such as income); (2) the structure of the equity measure, namely 
 
 31. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE 
CAPABILITIES APPROACH 78–80 (2000). 
 32. See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 17, at 31–32. 
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whether it focuses on raising individuals above some low level of well-
being or resources, or instead is concerned about the overall pattern 
of well-being or resources throughout the population; and (3) the 
application of equity measures under conditions of uncertainty, 
namely whether government should seek to equalize actual resources 
or well-being, or instead to equalize individuals’ expectations of 
resources or well-being.33 But all of the plausible possibilities are 
sensitive to the multiplicity of human interests represented on a list 
such as Professor Nussbaum’s. No plausible permutation would 
suggest that equality merely demands the equalization of safety or 
safety risks. 
Finally, policymakers who attend to moral rights also ought to 
engage in a kind of multidimensional analysis (bracketing 
institutional considerations).34 Preliminarily—a point that will be 
repeated below—it should be stressed that government does not 
violate moral rights merely by failing to mitigate a natural hazard that 
causes serious welfare setbacks. If I am a competent adult who 
listened to and understood the weather forecast and chose to remain 
in the path of a hurricane, suffering grave injury as a result, then 
government’s failure to force or induce me to evacuate did not violate 
my moral rights. However, there may well be some governmental 
choices regarding natural hazards that deontologists would see as 
rights-violating—for example, setting up a poorly constructed or 
inadequate levee, which is described to residents as protective but 
fails or is overtopped and harms some of them. 
The point I wish to make here is that the subset of harmful 
governmental choices that are rights-violating will not be limited to a 
particular aspect of welfare. One sometimes gets the sense from the 
environmental literature that the only genuine moral rights are rights 
to bodily integrity. Sophisticated deontologists would reject that view. 
I violate your rights by punching you or by stealing your car. 
 
 33. See Matthew D. Adler, Equity Analysis and Natural Hazards Policy, in ON RISK AND 
DISASTER: LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA 129 (Ronald J. Daniels et al. eds., 2006); 
Matthew D. Adler & Chris William Sanchirico, Inequality and Uncertainty: Theory and Legal 
Applications, 155 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2006). 
 34. It is plausible to think that there is a tight linkage between moral rights and 
“deontological” constraints or duties—namely, that P’s moral right is correlative to a 
deontological duty that Q owes to P, such as a duty not to kill P or impose a risk on P—and for 
purposes of this Article I use the notions of moral rights and deontological constraints 
interchangeably. For a discussion of deontological constraints on killing and risking, and 
citations to the literature on moral rights and deontological constraints, see Adler, supra note 8 
at 1223–32. 
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Similarly, government’s construction of a bad levee that ends up 
killing individuals and destroying many homes violates both moral 
rights to life and moral rights to property. 
It has been suggested to me that safety is not really a single 
dimension of well-being—in the way that, say, play or recreation is—
because being alive is a precondition for realizing any dimension of 
well-being.35 Consider Professor Nussbaum’s list. One can have 
friends (the good of affiliation), have a vibrant emotional life 
(emotions), develop and realize goals (practical reason), and so on, 
without engaging in play; but one cannot do any of these things 
without being alive. But this way of looking at things makes giving 
priority to safety seem yet more arbitrary. Imagine that the 
dimensions of well-being are {V1 . . . . . . VN} and longevity is seen, not 
as a separate dimension, but as a general precondition for realizing 
any of the Vi. Consider, now, a policy-analytic test that tells the 
policymaker to maximize longevity rather than engage in cost-benefit 
analysis. In effect, this tells the policymaker to consider changes to 
each Vi that occur in a certain way (through a change in an 
individual’s longevity), but not changes that occur in other ways (by 
changing enjoyment, recreation, friendship, consumption and so on 
without changing longevity). The longevity-maximization test 
therefore draws a (seemingly) arbitrary distinction between the 
different modalities by which an individual’s attainment of the various 
Vi can change. 
So is there any way to justify safety-prioritizing policy-analytic 
tests such as those put in place by the Delaney Clause, the food 
additive licensing provisions, section 109 of the Clean Air Act, or the 
OSHA toxins provision? Given the multidimensionality of welfare, 
and therewith the moral constructs that figure in weak welfarism—
overall well-being, equity, moral rights—is there any way to justify 
the widespread use by environmental decisionmakers of decision 
procedures that give special priority to safety? The answer is yes. 
Institutional considerations may perhaps warrant safety-prioritizing 
procedures. Bureaucrats are not cognitively perfect or perfectly law-
abiding; they cannot be expected to implement the policy-analytic 
criteria assigned to them with zero decision costs (direct and delay 
costs) and zero error rate.36 
 
 35. Thanks to David Driesen for pressing me to consider this point. 
 36. On the importance of institutional considerations in structuring administrative decision 
procedures, see ADLER & POSNER, supra note 17, at 62–123. 
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Consider the construct of overall well-being. It is possible that a 
provision which instructs an environmental agency to set pollution 
levels using a safety-maximization criterion is a better way to 
implement the criterion of overall well-being than a provision 
instructing the agency to set pollution levels using cost-benefit 
analysis. Why? The safety-maximization criterion has some (albeit 
quite imperfect) correlation with the construct of overall well-being.37 
Safety-maximizing projects are likelier to increase overall well-being 
than projects identified through a coin flip. Further, although the 
cost-benefit criterion is better correlated with overall well-being, cost-
benefit analysis may have higher decision costs, and/or be associated 
with a higher rate of bureaucratic error, than safety maximization. 
Cost-benefit analysis may be more expensive in terms of direct costs 
(meaning analysts’ wages, contractors’ fees, computer time, and the 
cost of securing information for the analysis). It may tend to take 
longer than safety-maximization, and therefore delay the 
implementation of beneficial policies more than safety maximization 
does. It could have a higher error rate38 than safety maximization—
because well-intentioned bureaucrats are more likely to make 
mistakes in their application of cost-benefit analysis than in their 
application of the safety-maximization criterion; or because the 
application of cost-benefit analysis by the agency is more difficult for 
the agency’s political overseers to monitor, making it easier for 
bureaucrats to advance their own (non-welfare-maximizing) 
preferences under the pretense of performing cost-benefit analysis. 
Considering both the correlation of the cost-benefit criterion and the 
safety-maximization criterion with overall well-being, and the 
decision costs and error rates associated with the two criteria, it could 
be the case that instructing some environmental agency to employ 
safety-maximization is actually better, in terms of overall well-being, 
than instructing the agency to employ cost-benefit analysis. 
For short, I will call this kind of argument for a policy-analytic 
criterion an “institutional” argument (because it attends to the actual 
results of directing governmental officials to follow some policy-
analytic criterion, given how governmental institutions actually work). 
 
 37. See id. at 91–95. 
 38. By error rate, I mean the rate at which the criterion assigned to bureaucrats (in this 
example, the cost-benefit criterion or the safety maximization criterion) is incorrectly applied. A 
criterion with zero error rate may, of course, still be inadvisable, if it is too poorly correlated 
with the underlying moral considerations such as overall well-being. 
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In point of fact, I very much doubt that institutional considerations do 
make safety-prioritizing procedures a better mechanism for advancing 
overall well-being than cost-benefit analysis.39 But this is an empirical 
question, having to do with the capacities and motivations of agency 
staff and overseers. 
 Whatever the answer to that question, one can draw the 
following cautionary lesson from environmental policy analysis: 
namely, natural hazards agencies should not arbitrarily give high 
priority to certain aspects of well-being over others. A policy-analytic 
technique that gives especial priority to safety, or some other human 
interest, is unjustified unless alternative, multidimensional procedures 
are actually a poorer way to implement weak welfarism, given the 
high decision costs and/or rate of bureaucratic error associated with 
these multidimensional techniques. Notably, the literature on 
environmental policymaking fails to provide this sort of institutional 
defense of prioritizing safety. 
 A second point: the institutional grounds for administrative 
procedures that give special priority to some aspect of well-being 
simply shift the locus of multidimensional policy analysis. A 
multidimensional analysis should still occur at some point in the 
governmental process. Perhaps high-level agency officials issue a 
directive instructing lower-level staff to employ unidimensional (e.g., 
safety-focused) analytic criteria in making some class of decisions. 
But then, presumably, the high-level officials should engage in some 
sort of multidimensional analysis to determine whether the 
unidimensional procedure tracks overall well-being, equity, or moral 
rights—all multidimensional constructs—sufficiently well. Or perhaps 
we are to imagine Congress instructing agency officials, at all levels, 
to employ the unidimensional criterion. But then Congress should 
 
 39. See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 17, at 62–123. The reader might wonder how the 
view generally adopted in this Article, which entertains the possibility of institutional 
justifications for policy-analytic criteria that give priority to a particular aspect of well-being 
(such as safety), or that are proxy criteria rather than focusing on well-being, is consistent with 
the defense of cost-benefit analysis that Eric Posner and I present in NEW FOUNDATIONS OF 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, supra note 17, and other work. The answer is twofold. First, and 
most importantly, our defense of cost-benefit analysis rests in part on empirical claims, about 
how cost-benefit actually works in institutions; in this Article I mean to bracket those empirical 
issues, and provide recommendations for natural hazards policy that can be accepted even by 
those who dispute our empirical claims. Second, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS recommends that cost-benefit analysis be used for large policy choices, and leaves 
open the question whether other criteria (with lower decision costs) would be appropriate for 
smaller decisions. See id. at 83, 186. 
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itself undertake a multidimensional analysis, or at least consult an 
expert commission about how to structure the agency’s 
decisionmaking. Before the commission can properly advise Congress 
to require the agency to focus on safety (for example), it ought to 
consider both the safety and non-safety components of overall well-
being, equity, and moral rights and determine that, given decision 
costs and bureaucratic error, a safety-focused procedure is the best 
way to implement these multidimensional moral constructs. 
How relevant are these observations about multidimensionality 
to natural hazards policy analysis? To begin, it is quite obviously true 
as an empirical matter that natural hazards not only kill or injure 
humans, but produce a variety of other sorts of welfare setbacks. 
They cause property damage, business interruptions, and resultant 
losses of wealth. Beyond that, they produce temporary or even 
protracted homelessness, psychological trauma, unemployment (often 
coupled with distress, anxiety, or anger), the disruption of families 
and communities, the interruption of schooling, and the destruction of 
cultural heritage.40 Further, even if the causal impact of some 
particular type of natural hazard were somehow confined to welfare 
dimension V*—even if, somehow, the hazard simply caused physical 
injury, or psychological trauma—the effect of a policy intervention to 
mitigate the hazard would involve governmental or private 
expenditures, which would ramify along dimensions other than V*. 
Natural hazards decisionmakers, like their environmental 
counterparts, do sometimes employ choice criteria that give special 
priority to certain aspects of well-being. The clearest example is 
ACE’s procedures for determining whether and how to build flood 
control structures, such as levees and floodwalls. ACE has for many 
years relied on cost-benefit analysis as its central criterion for making 
these decisions.41 However, this is a truncated kind of cost-benefit 
analysis. ACE has traditionally included economic costs and benefits 
 
 40. See HIDDEN COSTS, supra note 2, at 45–104; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE 
IMPACTS OF NATURAL DISASTERS: A FRAMEWORK FOR LOSS ESTIMATION (1999); Charles W. 
Howe & Harold C. Cochrane, Guidelines for the Uniform Definition, Identification, and 
Measurement of Economic Damages from Natural Hazard Events, in ECONOMICS AND THE 
WIND 159 (Bradley T. Ewing et al. eds., 2005). 
 41. On ACE’s decisionmaking procedures, see generally sources cited supra note 6. I say 
“as its central criterion” because ACE’s ultimate decisions are a mix of cost-benefit analysis and 
other factors—for example, building beyond the height identified by cost-benefit analysis, up to 
the one hundred-year flood, for levee certification purposes. See infra text accompanying notes 
53–55, 81. 
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in the analysis—the cost of building the structure, the benefit of the 
structure in reducing property damage to buildings and contents 
caused by inundation—but not safety or most ecological effects.42 
This is not to say that noneconomic factors are completely 
ignored. For example, ecological effects have traditionally been 
considered by ACE as a constraint on the maximization of economic 
benefits.43 But the agency’s practice has been to refrain from 
monetizing safety and most ecological effects and incorporating these 
impacts in its cost-benefit analyses of flood reduction measures. So 
there is an inversion from the environmental case, in which regulators 
often give priority to safety over economic costs. 
It is hard to see what the institutional justification for ACE’s 
truncated cost-benefit analysis would be. Consider safety benefits. 
The marginal decision costs of predicting both the safety and 
economic benefits of flood control structures, rather than simply the 
economic benefits, would seem to be low. Further, given that there 
are now well-accepted techniques for pricing safety, employed by 
environmental agencies in those instances when they do engage in 
cost-benefit analysis,44 it is not clear why adding safety to the list of 
monetized impacts would substantially increase bureaucratic shirking 
or error by ACE staff. To be sure, decisions about how to build flood 
control structures may typically have a small effect on the sheer 
number of flood fatalities and injuries, because the government can 
warn and evacuate in advance of a flood.45 However, the warn-and-
evacuate strategy is not perfect at preventing fatalities and injuries (as 
Katrina evidences) and the overall welfare value of saving even a 
single life is large. Thus information about safety impacts, which can 
be incorporated in ACE’s cost-benefit analysis at low marginal 
decision costs, would seem to be worth incorporating. 
What about the valuation of ecological effects? Here, ACE is on 
slightly firmer ground. Many applied economists believe that “non-
 
 42. See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 6, at 53–55, 60; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
RIVER BASINS AND COASTAL SYSTEMS PLANNING WITHIN THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF 
ENGINEERS 95–98 (2004). I say that ACE has refrained from monetizing “most” ecological 
effects because it does monetize recreational values. See WATER RESOURCES PLANNING, supra 
note 6, at 67–70. 
 43. See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 6, at 61. 
 44. See Adler, supra note 8, at 1197–98. 
 45. Thanks to Jason Johnston for this important observation—one that has also been 
made, independently, by Lester Lave and Tunde Balvanyos. See Lester B. Lave & Tunde 
Balvanyos, Risk Analysis and Management of Dam Safety, 18 RISK ANALYSIS 455, 458 (1998). 
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use” values should be incorporated in cost-benefit analysis, but I have 
argued elsewhere that this position is incorrect.46 I will not repeat the 
analysis here. Suffice it to say that cost-benefit analysis is a procedure 
for determining which policies increase overall well-being, and that 
willingness-to-pay amounts that are grounded in disinterested rather 
than self-interested preferences should therefore be screened out by 
the cost-benefit analyst. In the area of ecological valuation, this 
means screening out non-use values. On the other hand, it is hard to 
see why ACE would be justified in excluding use values from its cost-
benefit analyses—namely, changes to the well-being of those who 
physically interact with (“use”) some ecological resource, including 
recreational values such as hunting, fishing, boating, hiking, and 
camping; the benefits of clean, potable water and good visibility; 
scenic values; and so on. There is now a large literature in ecological 
economics on monetizing use values,47 and so the decision and 
manipulability costs of incorporating these in ACE’s cost-benefit 
procedure would seem to be lower than the benefit (in more 
accurately identifying welfare-maximizing flood control projects). 
Ultimately, whether ACE should monetize safety effects or 
ecological use values along with economic costs and benefits 
implicates empirical questions—about how different variants of cost-
benefit analysis would actually operate at ACE—that I can hardly 
resolve in this Article. The critical point, for my purposes here, is a 
more general one: well-being is multidimensional; the moral 
constructs of overall well-being, equity, and rights are also 
multidimensional; therefore, an administrative decision procedure 
which gives priority to one aspect of well-being or a proper subset of 
its aspects is suspect. Such a procedure should be critically scrutinized 
by agency overseers and academics, and should be rejected absent a 
persuasive institutional justification for the procedure—one that 
compares the procedure to alternative, multidimensional procedures 
in terms of decision costs, bureaucratic error rates, and correlation 
with underlying moral constructs. 
 
 46. See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 17, at 133–36; Matthew D. Adler, Welfare Polls: A 
Synthesis, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2006). 
 47. For reviews of ecological cost-benefit analysis, including use values, see A. MYRICK 
FREEMAN III, THE MEASUREMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE VALUES: THEORY 
AND METHODS (2d ed. 2003); A PRIMER ON NONMARKET VALUATION (Patricia A. Champ et 
al. eds., 2003); Maureen L. Cropper, Has Economic Research Answered the Needs of 
Environmental Policy?, 39 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 328 (2000). 
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B. Do Not Use Proxy Tests (AGIR) 
Technology-based policy analysis is widely used in environmental 
law. A preliminary word of clarification: sometimes, environmental 
regulations are divided into “command and control” regulations, 
which require firms to use specified technologies, and “performance” 
regulations, which demand a certain level of emissions reduction 
without specifying how to achieve that reduction. This distinction is 
not the one I mean to draw here. My interest, again, is in 
characterizing governmental choice procedures, not in differentiating 
the various kinds of primary obligations that government might 
impose on private individuals. 
Technology-based policy analysis uses technological criteria as 
part of the recipe for governmental choice. In the case of 
environmental policy, technology-based policy analysis tends to focus 
on “feasible” or “available” technology.48 Sometimes, technological 
considerations displace safety considerations as the main 
policymaking criterion. The provision in Clean Air Act section 112 
governing initial emissions limits has this form; EPA, in setting these 
limits, is instructed to consider technical feasibility as well as cost, but 
not safety.49 Sometimes, technological criteria are hybridized with 
safety or other considerations, as in the case of OSHA’s toxins 
provision, where technological feasibility functions as a constraint on 
the maximization of safety benefits. 
Technological availability or feasibility might be a matter of what 
is physically possible, given current science and engineering, or rather 
a matter of norms and practices among some group of actors.50 It is 
hard to imagine the first sort of approach having much role in natural 
hazards policy analysis. Consider levee design: the largest physically 
possible levee would be hundreds of feet high and massively thick and 
strong. Surely ACE should (always!) stop well short of this point in 
building its levees. “Physical possibility” as a goal in levee design 
would be absurd, and as a putative constraint would be no constraint 
at all. Parallel points could be made about the construction of hazard-
 
 48. See Driesen, supra note 30. 
 49. “These emission standards are to be based not on an assessment of the risks posed by 
[hazardous air pollutants], but instead on the maximum achievable control technology . . . for 
sources in each category.” Sierra Club v. EPA, 353 F.3d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 2004). As explained 
above, after EPA sets these initial limits, it must eventually consider setting lower limits, and at 
that stage does consider safety. See supra text accompanying notes 20–25. 
 50. See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 17, at 75, 91. 
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resistant buildings and structures—both ordinary residential and 
commercial property and more critical infrastructure. The strongest 
physically possible building would be absurdly expensive. Technology 
also comes into play in warnings and evacuations. It is technologically 
possible to evacuate everyone from Florida and the Gulf Coast for all 
of hurricane season, or to send a government representative to warn 
every household in person.51 But these are not serious policy 
proposals. 
Technological availability in the second, norms and practices 
sense, is more thinkable. For example, seismic codes could be 
specified with reference to current building practices. New 
construction could be required to be as protective as some percentile 
of existing construction.52 
A different sort of technology-based approach to policy analysis, 
exemplified by ACE practices, employs specific technological rules of 
thumb. Until the 1990s, ACE traditionally “added 3 feet of freeboard 
to the design height of its levees, a principle that became a staple of 
Corps flood damage reduction studies and projects.”53 This three-feet-
of-freeboard rule was, in particular, used when ACE built levees to 
withstand a one hundred-year flood, rather than to maximize net 
benefits—which occurred when local communities were willing to 
subsidize the additional levee construction costs needed to reach the 
one hundred-year mark, so that the area protected by the levee would 
not be counted as part of the one hundred-year floodplain for 
purposes of the National Flood Insurance Program.54 Adding three 
feet was “a measure to prevent overtopping caused by higher 
water . . . than was forecast for the design flood, as some uncertainties 
may not have been explicitly considered.”55 
Closely related to technology-based policy analysis, and an 
important tool in current natural hazards decisionmaking, is 
reliability-based analysis.56 An excellent example is the approach used 
 
 51. See, e.g., Roger Pielke, Jr. & R.E. Carbone, Weather Impacts, Forecasts, and Policy: An 
Integrated Perspective, BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y, Mar. 2002, at 393 (discussing costs 
of overwarning about hurricanes and other adverse weather impacts). 
 52. See Bruce R. Ellingwood, Earthquake Risk Assessment of Building Structures, 74 
RELIABILITY ENGINEERING & SYS. SAFETY 251, 256 (2001). 
 53. FLOOD DAMAGE REDUCTION STUDIES, supra note 6, at 13. See generally id. at 139–58. 
 54. See infra note 81. 
 55. FLOOD DAMAGE REDUCTION STUDIES, supra note 6, at 13. 
 56. In general, reliability-based tests for structures might be framed as: “Use all feasible 
technology to ensure that the structure performs function F except in extreme event E,” where 
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by governmental or quasi-governmental bodies in drafting seismic 
building codes.57 These bodies typically aim to write codes that will 
avoid building collapse in the event of any nonextreme earthquake 
(for example, any earthquake smaller than the 475-year 
earthquake).58 The decisional criterion employed by the code drafters 
is “prevent building collapse in nonextreme earthquakes” rather than 
“maximize net benefits, including both economic and safety impacts” 
or “maximize safety benefits.” A similar approach has been 
traditionally used in designing dams, specifically in deciding how low 
the risk of dam failure (collapse or overtopping) should be. The goal 
has traditionally been to design the dam so that it will not fail except 
in an extreme precipitation event.59 The criterion, here, is “construct 
the dam so that it will not fail during nonextreme rainfalls” rather 
than “maximize net benefits,” defined inclusively or narrowly. 
To sum up: a variety of proxy tests are currently used, or might 
conceivably be used, by environmental and natural hazards 
decisionmakers. These are proxy tests insofar as they focus the 
decisionmaker’s attention on some feature of available choices other 
than their impact on well-being or some of its dimensions. Proxy tests 
might be technology-based tests (of various kinds), or, a close cousin, 
reliability tests. Or they might take some other form. 
All this is descriptive. But are proxy tests an appropriate policy-
analytic tool for environmental or natural hazard regulators? The 
answer should have a familiar ring: proxy tests are justifiable, if at all, 
on institutional grounds. And even if proxy tests are justified, their 
use by administrative agencies simply shifts the locus of welfare-
focused, (non-proxy-based) decisionmaking within the governmental 
process. 
 
F might be not collapsing (in the case of a building), remaining passable (in the case of a bridge 
or roadway), generating electricity (in the case of a power plant), and so on. 
 57. On seismic codes, see OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, REDUCING 
EARTHQUAKE LOSSES (1995) [hereinafter REDUCING EARTHQUAKE LOSSES]; Ellingwood, 
supra note 52. 
 58. See REDUCING EARTHQUAKE LOSSES, supra note 57, at 78–79, 103–09; Julian J. 
Bommer, Deterministic Vs. Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Assessment: An Exaggerated and 
Obstructive Dichotomy, 6 J. EARTHQUAKE ENGINEERING 43, 60–61 (2002); Ellingwood, supra 
note 52. 
 59. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SAFETY OF DAMS: FLOOD AND EARTHQUAKE 
CRITERIA 8–60 (1985); Lave & Balvanyos, supra note 45; David A. Moser, Risk-Based Analysis 
in Flood Damage Reduction Studies, in U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, HYDROLOGY & 
HYDRAULICS WORKSHOP ON RISK-BASED ANALYSIS FOR FLOOD DAMAGE REDUCTION 
STUDIES 1, 2–4 (1997). 
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To begin, it is clear that proxy tests will, at some rate, select 
suboptimal policies—policies that are worse than alternatives with 
respect to overall welfare, equity, and rights. The critical literature on 
technology-based tests in environmental law makes this point, 
showing how a requirement that firms employ “feasible” pollution-
reducing measures can lead to inefficient overregulation (if, for 
example, small firms are required to employ high-fixed-cost 
technologies) or underregulation (if it would be most efficient to 
reduce pollution beyond the point that is technologically feasible 
given continued production of the good, for example by shutting 
down production entirely).60 
Similar observations can be made about proxy-based criteria for 
natural hazards policymaking. Consider ACE’s three-feet-of-
freeboard rule. The rule is meant to provide an extra margin of 
protection for communities at risk of flooding. But the protection 
provided by the rule varies from community to community. A recent 
study by the National Research Council found that the annual 
probability of flooding in communities protected by levees built to the 
one hundred-year flood plus three feet of freeboard varied widely, 
from one in ten thousand to one in one hundred.61 “[T]his fixed-
freeboard approach provided inconsistent degrees of flood protection 
to different communities and provided substantially different levels of 
protection in different regions.”62 
A similar point can be made about the incremental protection 
provided by the three-feet-of-freeboard rule. Absent freeboard, the 
community will have an annual probability p of flooding; after 
freeboard, the community will have an annual probability q of 
flooding. The difference between p and q depends on local hydrology 
(the shape of the so-called flood-frequency curve) and local 
hydraulics (the features of the channel in which the flood waters 
flow). Finally, the variable incremental protection provided by the 
three-feet-of-freeboard rule has no systematic connection to the 
benefits of incremental protection—to the amount of property and 
number of lives at risk. 
Or consider the proxy test used to write seismic building codes: 
ensure that buildings do not collapse except in extreme earthquakes. 
 
 60. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 
STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1334–40 (1985). 
 61. FLOOD DAMAGE REDUCTION STUDIES, supra note 6, at 144–45, 149–58. 
 62. Id. at 13. 
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This maps, roughly, onto a safety-focused test, which says to construct 
buildings to avoid fatalities except in extreme earthquakes—since 
fatalities caused by building shaking in earthquakes mainly occur 
when buildings collapse.63 But the mapping is not perfect, because 
some damage to buildings short of collapse may cause fatalities (for 
example, when ceilings or lights fall on occupants).64 Further, much 
economic loss can occur when buildings are shaken without 
collapsing: direct economic loss by virtue of damaged building 
components, systems, or contents (which are expensive to replace), 
indirect economic loss by virtue of business interruption, and other 
indirect effects. 
  Recent experience . . . has shown that structural collapses, 
although spectacular and newsworthy, are by no means the only 
source of earthquake-related losses. Economic losses also stem from 
business interruptions; loss of records and computer databases in the 
service economy; . . . and widespread, noncatastrophic damage to 
residential and commercial structures throughout the earthquake 
region. . . . [One] estimate implies that catastrophic building failure, 
which is what codes and retrofits are designed to prevent, will be 
responsible for less than one-tenth of California’s future bill for 
direct earthquake losses.65 
In short, “a code-complying building can ‘survive’ an earthquake (i.e., 
not collapse and kill people) and still end up a shambles inside and 
out.”66 Weak welfarism surely does not require that all buildings be 
reinforced to the point of suffering no damage at all in nonextreme 
earthquakes. But presumably there is some such strengthening 
beyond the point identified by the no-collapse proxy that would be 
warranted—in particular, that would have welfare benefits exceeding 
the costs of the additional strengthening. 
Even though proxy-based tests pick out suboptimal policies at 
some nonzero rate, instructing agencies to employ proxy tests can be 
optimal if they are sufficiently accurate in tracking overall well-being, 
 
 63. See REDUCING EARTHQUAKE LOSSES, supra note 57, at 72–73. 
 64. See CAL. SEISMIC SAFETY COMM’N, EARTHQUAKE RISK MANAGEMENT: MITIGATION 
SUCCESS STORIES 17–20 (1999) (discussing program to reinforce ceiling lighting systems in Los 
Angeles School District buildings, given the risk of injuries or fatalities if systems fell during an 
earthquake). 
 65. REDUCING EARTHQUAKE LOSSES, supra note 57, at 110. 
 66. Id. at 106. For a similar point about the losses in Hurricane Andrew from building 
damage short of collapse, see MILETI, supra note 5, at 129. 
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equity, and moral rights, and if the decision costs and rate of 
bureaucratic error under alternative tests is sufficiently high. But is 
this possibility in fact realized? In the domain of environmental 
policy, the answer is difficult and contested, and may well depend on 
context. Technology-based proxies may not require a risk 
assessment,67 whereas a cost-benefit or safety-maximization procedure 
will. So technology-based proxies may have lower decision costs. But, 
given advances in computational speed, software, and data 
availability, which facilitate risk assessment,68 the decision-cost gap, 
here, is shrinking. Technology-based proxies may also be clearer in 
their requirements, hence less manipulable by bureaucrats (or interest 
groups). The shift from a safety-maximization approach to a 
technology-based approach does seem to have revived the regulation 
of air pollutants under section 112 of the Clean Air Act.69 On the 
other hand, FDA has long regulated food additives using risk 
assessment, under the general requirement that food additives be 
“safe.” It clearly has managed to evaluate numerous additives, 
specifically by using a test that ensures that the “individual risk” to a 
high-end (90th percentile) food consumer is below a “no observed 
adverse effect level” (NOAEL) based threshold (for noncarcinogenic 
toxins) or the threshold of a one-in-one million lifetime fatality risk 
(for carcinogen-containing additives exempt from the Delaney 
Clause).70 Although FDA has tried to evade the Delaney Clause, 
finding various statutory loopholes to subject carcinogens to the one-
in-one million de minimis threshold instead,71 I am not aware of 
evidence that the FDA has regularly subverted this safety threshold 
or the parallel threshold for noncarcinogens to serve nonsafety goals. 
 
 67. By risk assessment, again, I mean a characterization of the impact of the natural hazard 
on one or more aspects of well-being. A policy-analytic test that is framed purely in terms of 
technology will not require a risk assessment, but a hybrid test that references both technology 
and safety (or other aspect(s) of well-being) will. 
 68. See F. Bendimerad, Loss Estimation: A Powerful Tool for Risk Assessment and 
Mitigation, 21 SOIL DYNAMICS & EARTHQUAKE ENGINEERING 467 (2001); Michael E. 
Hodgson & Susan L. Cutter, Mapping and the Spatial Analysis of Hazardscapes, in AMERICAN 
HAZARDSCAPES, supra note 2, at 50–60; Jason K. Levy et al., Advances in Decision Support 
Systems for Flood Disaster Management: Challenges and Opportunities, 21 WATER RESOURCES 
DEV. 593 (2005). 
 69. See, e.g., David P. Novello, The Air Toxics Program at the Crossroads: From MACT to 
Residual Risk, 18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 57 (2004). 
 70. See Adler, supra note 8, at 1164–67. 
 71. See id. at 1165–67; Richard A. Merrill, FDA’s Implementation of the Delaney Clause: 
Repudiation of Congressional Choice or Reasoned Adaptation to Scientific Progress?, 5 YALE J. 
ON REG. 1 (1988). 
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Scholars need to think about proxy-based natural hazards tests in 
similar terms—by looking to the decision costs and bureaucratic error 
rates associated with these tests, as compared to alternative policy-
analytic tests. In some cases, it will pretty clearly emerge that a proxy-
based test is unjustifiable. Consider ACE’s three-feet-of-freeboard 
test, used as a factor to ensure that levees built to protect 
communities from the one hundred-year flood are not overtopped. 
Determining the flood elevation in a settled area that would occur in 
the event of the one hundred-year flood entails a complicated, 
quantitative, model-driven analysis by ACE. Why, then, use a safety 
factor in calculating levee height, rather than directly calculating the 
height that achieves some given level of protection (for example, a 
five percent chance of being overtopped in the one hundred-year 
flood)?72 It is very hard to see why the three-feet-of-freeboard rule 
substantially lowers the decision costs of ACE decisionmaking, or 
makes it less manipulable. By contrast, the use of no-collapse tests in 
designing building codes plausibly has substantial institutional 
advantages as opposed to, for example, cost-benefit analysis. 
Determining the no-collapse level, by contrast with cost-benefit 
analysis, does not require determining the lives saved or direct or 
indirect economic costs avoided by various possible degrees of 
building strength. So there is some apparent economy in terms of 
decision and manipulability costs. 
C. Do Not Ignore Population Size (AGIR) 
A policy-analytic criterion is insensitive to population size when 
it chooses a policy without reference to the number of individuals 
harmed by, or exposed to, the environmental or natural hazard that 
the policy is redressing.73 In the area of environmental and natural 
 
 72. An even more straightforward criterion would be that the levee must reduce the annual 
probability of flooding in the protected area to one-in-one hundred. On these points, and the 
subtle difference between the annual probability of flooding in the protected area (which looks 
to the full range of possible floods that the levee might encounter) and the probability of 
protection from the one hundred-year flood (which looks to the chance that the levee will be 
overtopped by a flood of a particular magnitude, namely that magnitude the annual exceedance 
probability of which is 1/100), see FLOOD DAMAGE REDUCTION STUDIES, supra note 6, at 139–
58. 
 73. Population-size sensitivity, as I define it, is a matter of the conceptual structure of 
policy-analytic criteria. A criterion that will choose the same policy when the size of the exposed 
population is varied, and everything else is held constant, is “population size insensitive.” In 
practice, larger populations may correlate with other factors to which the criterion is sensitive. 
For example, industries that affect larger populations may tend to develop more advanced 
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hazards policy, this typically occurs in two ways. First, the agency 
might employ a proxy test (such as a technology-based or reliability-
based proxy) for selecting policies, specifically one that does not 
attend to a policy’s efficacy with respect to safety, property, 
psychological well-being, or the other dimensions of well-being 
affected by natural hazards.74 Second, the agency might employ a 
policy-analytic criterion that does focus on some or all of these 
dimensions, but is structured in a population-size-insensitive way. 
An environmental-policy example of the first, proxy-based 
variant of population-size insensitivity would be a requirement that 
the agency set emissions levels for new sources in each industrial 
category at a level achievable by the best available technology, or by 
the top quartile of polluters. This criterion makes no reference to the 
safety impacts of a given industrial category’s emissions and, in 
particular, to the number of individuals exposed to or killed by its 
pollutants. Two industrial categories that emit pollutant X will be 
required to reduce X to the same level even if one of the categories 
has many more firms, and affects a much larger population, than the 
other. 
A natural-hazards example of the population-size insensitivity 
that flows from a proxy test would be a reliability-based criterion for 
designing structures which stipulates that the structure must not fail 
except in a specified extreme event. Consider, for example, the 
criterion that seismic codes should ensure that no building collapse 
except in a 475-year earthquake. This criterion does not attend to 
whether the building being strengthened will contain a few 
individuals, a few dozens, hundreds, or thousands. 
Population-size insensitivity of the second kind routinely occurs 
in environmental law, by virtue of “individual risk” tests.75 These tests 
characterize an environmental hazard’s safety impact by looking to 
the incremental individual fatality risk borne by some individual in 
 
technologies—something that a test of technological feasibility would attend to. Still, it is 
important to distinguish between criteria that are structured so as to be attuned to population 
size, and criteria whose application may simply have some correlation with population size. 
Absent institutional considerations, our government’s policy-analytic criteria should have 
population-size sensitivity built into them. 
 74. A hybrid test that both incorporates proxy considerations and attends to a hazard’s 
well-being impact could be sensitive to population size—for example, “use all technologically 
feasible measures to reduce emissions of the toxin, up to the point where the expected number 
of deaths caused by the toxin is less than one.” 
 75. See Adler, supra note 8, at 1147–79. 
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the exposure distribution, such as the average, maximally exposed, or 
highly exposed (e.g., 90th percentile) individual, rather than to the 
number of deaths caused by the hazard.76 For example, the EPA’s 
rules for remedying hazardous waste sites under the Superfund 
statute mandate that a site cleanup must occur whenever the 
maximally exposed individual incurs an incremental lifetime fatality 
risk exceeding one in ten thousand, and must bring his risk below that 
level.77 This is true regardless of whether the site is in a remote or 
settled area.78 
“Individual risk” tests, although sometimes mooted in the 
scholarly literature on natural hazards,79 seem not to have been 
explicitly used by natural hazards regulators. But they have a very 
close analogue in a criterion that is sometimes used in choosing 
policies (such as building levees or floodwalls or evacuating residents) 
to protect settled areas from floods and hurricanes. Call this the 
“area-protection” criterion. It says that a policy must be chosen that 
protects the settled area from all but extreme events (from all but the 
one hundred-year flood, the one hundred-year hurricane, the 
probable maximum flood, the probable maximum hurricane). 
Although ACE’s current stated policy is not to use the area-
protection criterion in selecting its preferred projects, relying instead 
on cost-benefit analysis,80 the area-protection criterion is important 
under the National Flood Insurance Program81 and has been 
 
 76. An “individual risk” test could be structured in a population-size-sensitive fashion—for 
example, minimize the number of individuals with an “individual risk” above some level. 
However, “individual risk” tests currently employed in environmental policy are not generally 
thus structured. Also, it should be clarified that “individual risk” tests are sometimes one 
element in a broader decisionmaking procedure, where other components are population-size 
sensitive, but the “individual risk” test itself is not—and that needs justification. 
 77. See Adler, supra note 8, at 1156–58. 
 78. EPA does have discretion in choosing the target “individual risk” for the remedy, 
which can lie anywhere in the range from one in ten thousand to one in one million. It appears 
that EPA gives little weight to the size of the population exposed to the waste site in exercising 
this discretion. See id. 
 79. See, e.g., Edmund Penning-Rowsell et al., Estimating Injury and Loss of Life in Floods: 
A Deterministic Framework, 36 NAT. HAZARDS 43 (2005). 
 80. See sources cited supra note 6; U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, PUB. NO. ER 1105-2-101, 
PLANNING: RISK ANALYSIS FOR FLOOD DAMAGE REDUCTION STUDIES 3–4 (2006), available at 
http://www.usace.army.mil/publications/eng-regs/er1105-2-101/entire.pdf. 
 81. More precisely, the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) creates an incentive for 
localities to pay the costs of constructing levees that will protect one hundred-year floodplains. 
Removing an area from the one hundred-year floodplain means that buildings within the area 
are no longer subject to the mandatory purchase of flood insurance, and that the community (if 
it wants to continue participating in the NFIP, which provides subsidized insurance for certain 
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employed in other contexts as well.82 In effect, the area-protection 
criterion says that the annual risk of death or property damage to 
anyone in the settled area must not exceed one in one hundred (if the 
 
buildings within the one hundred-year floodplain) is no longer required to regulate construction 
in the area in accordance with the NFIP. Because these incentives are stronger for communities 
with more densely settled floodplains, the levee construction generated by the NFIP can be 
expected to correlate with population size. On the NFIP, see Edward T. Pasterick, The National 
Flood Insurance Program, in PAYING THE PRICE: THE STATUS AND ROLE OF INSURANCE 
AGAINST NATURAL DISASTERS IN THE UNITED STATES 125 (Howard Kunreuther & Richard J. 
Roth, Sr. eds., 1998); RUTHERFORD H. PLATT, DISASTERS AND DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS 
OF EXTREME NATURAL EVENTS 28–33 (1999); FLOOD DAMAGE REDUCTION STUDIES, supra 
note 6, at 139–47. 
 82. It appears that levees to protect cities have generally been built to withstand something 
like the probable maximum flood. 
Another magnitude of flood that can occur is one that results from the standard 
project flood (SPF) discharge. This event is not assigned a frequency or recurrence 
interval, although it is often used by hydrologic engineers to approximate the 0.2 
percent annual chance (500-year) flood. The SPF discharge in a river represents the 
flow that can be expected from the most severe combination of meteorologic and 
hydrologic conditions reasonably characteristic of the geographic region involved . . . . 
The SPF discharge is currently used for design of engineered structures, which, if 
compromised, could result in catastrophic flooding. The SPF discharge is generally 
used to determine the level of protection for urban population centers where there is 
great threat of loss of life and of damage to critical infrastructure. 
INTERAGENCY FLOODPLAIN MGMT. REVIEW COMM., SHARING THE CHALLENGE: 
FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT INTO THE 21ST CENTURY 60 (1994); see also id. at 70–72 
(suggesting that the goal of floodplain management, for population centers and critical 
infrastructure—but not in general—should be to reduce vulnerability from an SPF discharge); 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT AND THE AMERICAN RIVER BASIN 
115 (1995). Note how a decision rule that says “build levees to protect cities from the probable 
maximum flood” incorporates a crude kind of population-size sensitivity. It sorts settlements 
into two categories—cities, i.e., settlements with large populations, versus other settlements—
but does not distinguish among cities with respect to population size. 
It is notable that the urban portions of the New Orleans levee system were designed with 
reference to the “Standard Project Hurricane”: 
For [the] Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity [project] and [the] West Bank and Vicinity 
[project], the Standard Project Hurricane (SPH) was selected as the design hurricane 
because of the urban nature of the project area. The Standard Project Hurricane was 
defined as a hypothetical hurricane intended to represent the most severe 
combination of hurricane parameters that [was] reasonably characteristic of a 
specified region. 
3 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE NEW ORLEANS AND 
SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: DRAFT FINAL REPORT OF THE 
INTERAGENCY PERFORMANCE EVALUATION TASK FORCE, at III-12 (2006). 
Finally, it should be noted the construct of the SPF or SPH is not, strictly, the same as that 
of the probable maximum flood or hurricane. See id. at III-33 to III-35 (describing the SPH as 
looking to the most severe meteorological conditions that are “reasonably characteristic” of the 
region, whereas the probable maximum hurricane looks to the most severe combination that is 
“reasonably possible”). That distinction is not material to my analysis here. Whether defined in 
terms of the one hundred-year event, the standard project event, or the probable maximum 
event, the area-protection criterion is population-size insensitive. 
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one hundred-year cutoff is used) or zero (if the probable maximum 
event is used), regardless of the number of individuals living in the 
settled area or owning property there. 
Should weak welfarists be troubled by policy-analytic criteria 
that are insensitive to population size? I suggest that they should be. 
A plausible case can be made that all the moral criteria subsumed 
under weak welfarism are sensitive to population size.83 This is clearly 
true of overall well-being. Increase the size of the population that 
occupies some building, or that is endangered by a flood or hurricane, 
and the expected benefit to overall welfare of strengthening the 
building or constructing a protective levee increases as well. 
It is also quite plausible that equity is sensitive to population size. 
Demonstrating this in detail would require me to work through the 
various plausible specifications of “equity”—comparative versus 
noncomparative, ex ante versus ex post, welfare-based versus 
resource-based. Because I lack space to do so, let me focus on the 
particular specification that I have argued for elsewhere: namely that 
“equity” above all means identifying “poverty lines” with respect to 
different well-being dimensions, and reducing the extent to which 
individuals fall below these lines.84 Clearly, this approach to equity is 
population-size sensitive. Double the number of individuals expected 
to suffer grave psychological trauma, or protracted homelessness or 
unemployment, or income poverty, or death as a result of a structural 
collapse, and the equity benefits of avoiding collapse increase. 
Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, a strong case can be made that 
moral rights are population-size sensitive. Consider, first, the moral 
right not to be wrongly killed—a moral right that all deontologists 
accept.85 P wrongly kills Q if P causes Q’s death and further 
conditions are satisfied (the nature of which is a matter of dispute 
among deontologists). The point to see here is that the number of 
people who will be killed, or wrongly killed, if some building collapses 
or some community is hit by a flood or hurricane depends on the 
number of individuals in the building or community. Now, it might be 
objected that, because deontological rights are absolute, the number 
of wrongful killings is irrelevant—government has an absolute duty to 
prevent even one. But no one really believes this, at least when the 
 
 83. See Adler, supra note 8, at 1240–46. 
 84. See Adler, supra note 33. 
 85. See Adler, supra note 8, at 1225–27. 
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victims are not identified ex ante: who believes that government has 
an absolute obligation to stop wrongful homicides? At least in the 
case of unidentified victims, the weight of government’s deontological 
reason to prevent the wrongful killings that would occur as a 
consequence of natural hazards must be (in part) a function of the 
expected number of such killings. 
What if we supplement the right not to be killed with a right not 
to be wrongly put at risk of death? On the first view, only those who 
are actually killed by the structure’s collapse have their rights 
violated; on the second, individuals who don’t die still might suffer 
rights infringements, given the risk imposed on them. A deontologist 
who adopts this latter view will need to specify the conditions under 
which P’s action increasing Q’s risk of death is deontologically 
wrongful.86 However those conditions are specified, it is surely not the 
case that government has an absolute obligation to prevent wrongful 
risk impositions—which would be even less plausible than the view 
that it has an absolute obligation to prevent wrongful killings. At 
most it has a defeasible deontological obligation to prevent wrongful 
risk impositions, the strength of which presumably depends on the 
number of individuals at risk. 
If overall welfare, equity, and rights are sensitive to population 
size, it follows that size-insensitive policy-analytic criteria are 
justifiable only on institutional grounds. 
It would seem that proxy tests can, sometimes, meet this burden 
of justification. Proxy tests focus the decisionmaker on some feature 
of policies other than well-being, and population-size insensitivity is 
one consequence of this refocusing, but the refocusing may be 
warranted, if the proxy test has sufficient advantages in terms of 
decision costs and bureaucratic error. Still, it is important for agency 
overseers and academics to be attentive to the disadvantages of proxy 
tests, including population-size insensitivity. Note also that a proxy 
test might incorporate administrable proxies for population size—for 
example, using a more extreme earthquake in defining the no-
collapse criterion for large as opposed to small structures.87 
 
 86. See id. at 1227–32. 
 87. Indeed, seismic codes typically do this. “[B]uilding codes distinguish in terms of 
building use. In general, structures that serve critical functions (e.g., hospitals) or house large 
numbers of people (e.g., schools) are held to a higher standard than are less important, more 
thinly occupied buildings.” REDUCING EARTHQUAKE LOSSES, supra note 57, at 106. 
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What about the second kind of population-size insensitivity, 
exemplified by “individual risk” tests in environmental law or by the 
closely analogous “area protection” criterion for natural hazards 
which says that flood- or hurricane-prone communities must be 
defended by physical structures, relocated, or otherwise protected so 
that the risk of harm to anyone in the community is reduced to some 
cutoff? These approaches seem hard to justify. On the one hand, the 
agency is told to consider policy effects in mitigating hazard impacts 
along some welfare dimension(s). Yet the agency is also instructed to 
ignore the number of individuals who would be benefited by the 
policy. Why expect that the institutional benefits of this relatively 
modest truncation of the analysis will be substantial? 
To be more concrete, let us imagine that cost-benefit analysis has 
proven too elastic and manipulable in the hands of ACE, and that the 
agency is best instructed to focus on safety. “Choose protective 
measures for flood- or hurricane-prone settlements so as to minimize 
safety risks.” That directive could be specified in population-size-
insensitive terms (“Ensure that flooding will not occur in any settled 
area, except in the X-year flood”), or in size-sensitive terms (“Ensure 
that the expected number of annual deaths from flooding in any given 
community is below D**”). D** could be one, or it could be a 
number keyed to the average costs of building levees in many 
communities. 
Both the size-insensitive technique and the size-sensitive 
technique require the levee designer to estimate the frequency of 
floods and hurricanes of various magnitudes, and the efficacy of 
different policies in preventing flood or hurricane waters from 
reaching the settlement. The latter technique requires, in addition, 
that the system designer consider how many individuals reside in the 
settlement, and how many are likely to die if it is flooded. Given the 
current state of our information about population patterns and our 
models for predicting population impacts, the institutional costs of 
this incremental step would seem to be pretty small. 
D. Do Not Use Arbitrary Non-Zero Numerical Cutoffs 
Environmental policy analysis frequently uses non-zero 
numerical cutoffs, particularly in specifying “individual risk” tests. 
When regulatory intervention to mitigate some toxin or radiation 
source is keyed to the incremental “individual risk” incurred by the 
maximally exposed individual or someone else in the exposure 
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distribution, it becomes crucial to specify what the relevant 
“individual risk” level is. In the case of carcinogens, different levels 
are used, depending on the agency and program. The most frequent 
cutoffs are incremental lifetime fatality risks of one in one million, 
one in one hundred thousand, one in ten thousand or one in one 
thousand (the last, used by OSHA).88 
Noncarcinogens are treated differently. Why? By contrast with 
carcinogens, noncarcinogens are traditionally believed to have a 
toxicity threshold: a dose level below which the noncarcinogen will 
not cause harm. But non-zero cutoffs creep into policy analysis, even 
here—given uncertainty about what the threshold level for a 
particular noncarcinogen is. Imagine that an environmental agency 
aims to bring the maximally exposed individual or some other person 
in the exposure distribution below his toxicity threshold, but also 
wishes to avoid the massive costs of requiring zero exposure. Then it 
will need to employ some non-zero cutoff to specify an acceptable 
degree of uncertainty about whether the relevant individual is above 
the toxicity threshold—because at any exposure above zero, the 
agency cannot be completely certain that the threshold is not 
exceeded. In practice, programs that regulate noncarcinogens 
typically take the NOAEL observed in rodent experiments—the level 
of the toxin that produces no observed incremental frequency of 
death—and then divide that by some safety factor (ten, one hundred, 
or one thousand) to estimate a “reference” level of the 
noncarcinogen. These safety factors are non-zero cutoffs that are 
meant to ensure a high—but not complete—degree of certainty that 
the relevant individual is below his toxicity threshold.89 
Natural hazards policymakers also use cutoffs. As we have seen, 
various criteria require policymakers to protect against natural hazard 
events up to some extreme point. Sometimes, the extreme point is set 
at some non-zero number. The National Flood Insurance Program is 
structured around the one hundred-year flood.90 Earthquake codes 
are often designed to avoid building collapse in a 475-year 
earthquake.91 
Sometimes, the extreme point is set with reference to the 
probable maximum event. Levees are sometimes built to withstand 
 
 88. See Adler, supra note 8, at 1147–79. 
 89. See id. at 1161–65. 
 90. See sources cited supra note 81. 
 91. See Bommer, supra note 58, at 60. 
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the “standard project flood” or “probable maximum flood.” “The 
SPF discharge in a river represents the flow that can be expected from 
the most severe combination of meteorologic and hydrologic 
conditions reasonably characteristic of the geographic region 
involved.”92 Similarly, structures might be strengthened to resist the 
“probable maximum earthquake.”93 The probable maximum event 
represents a kind of zero risk level.94 If the causal laws governing 
floods or hurricanes are deterministic, then it is intelligible to try to 
identify a maximal event—an event that cannot be exceeded at a 
given location, given those causal laws—and to design to that. But 
even here, non-zero numerical cutoffs may creep in, given our 
uncertainty about the causal laws or about the strength of 
structures—just as non-zero cutoffs creep into the regulation of 
noncarcinogens via the “safety factors.” For example, an agency 
decisionmaker told to design, or specify regulations for, a class of 
structures sufficient to ensure that they survive the probable 
maximum event might be told that he should be 95 percent certain of 
survival.95 
Non-zero cutoffs may be justifiable. First, it is possible that weak-
welfarist morality itself incorporates non-zero cutoffs. Overall well-
being does not. If a given person is benefited or harmed, even a little 
bit, by some event or policy, then overall well-being goes up or down 
too. Any positive or negative change in how some individual fares 
with respect to some welfare dimension can change that individual’s 
well-being; any positive or negative change to an individual’s well-
being can change overall well-being. Zero is the natural threshold for 
purposes of the overall-welfare construct. 
But equity may have non-zero cutoffs. For example, a threshold-
based conception of equity—one that seeks to bring individuals above 
“poverty lines,” representing minimum levels of achievement with 
respect to different well-being dimensions—contains non-zero cutoffs, 
namely the levels of the thresholds. Some specifications of moral 
 
 92. INTERAGENCY FLOODPLAIN MGMT. REVIEW COMM., supra note 82, at 60. 
 93. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ESTIMATING LOSSES FROM FUTURE EARTHQUAKES 
20–25 (1989); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SAFETY OF DAMS, supra note 59, at 61–63; Bommer, 
supra note 58. 
 94. See Moser, supra note 59, at 2. 
 95. Cf. FLOOD DAMAGE REDUCTION STUDIES, supra note 6, at 139–58 (describing levee 
certification criteria that look to 0.90 or 0.95 probability of passing the one hundred-year flood); 
Ellingwood, supra note 52, at 259 (suggesting 0.90 probability of surviving the five hundred-year 
earthquake as a possible goal for building design). 
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rights, too, involve non-zero cutoffs. Deontological theorists who 
recognize a right not to be exposed to risk might conceivably specify 
that as a right not to be exposed to a high risk.96 
Second, it is possible that non-zero cutoffs may be justifiable on 
institutional grounds. For example, a commission might perform a 
cost-benefit analysis for a sample of toxic waste dumps; ascertain 
which remedial standard R* (defined in terms of “individual risk” to 
the maximally exposed individual) maximizes the net benefits of 
cleaning up all the dumps; and then advise that the cleanup agency be 
instructed to use that R* in performing its cleanups (not trusting the 
agency to do cost-benefit analysis of individual waste sites). 
In point of fact, however, the actual “individual risk” numbers 
employed by environmental policy agencies—one in one million, one 
in one hundred thousand, one in ten thousand, one in one thousand—
seem to be pretty arbitrary.97 As far as I am aware, neither the 
agencies that use these cutoffs nor academics have persuasively 
defended these particular numbers as either corresponding to morally 
fundamental cutoffs, or as the numbers that optimize overall well-
being (or equity or rights) across a range of administrative programs. 
One might similarly worry about the arbitrariness of the non-
numerical cutoffs employed in natural hazards policymaking. The one 
hundred-year recurrence interval, central to the National Flood 
Insurance Program, was apparently set in an intuitive way, without 
any systematic analysis.98 As for the return intervals used for seismic 
design: 
[T]he almost universal use of the 475-year return period in [seismic] 
codes can be traced back to the hazard study for the USA produced 
by Algermissen and Perkins, which was based on an exposure period 
of 50 years (a typical design life) and a probability of 10% of 
exceedance, whose selection has not been explained. . . . A review of 
seismic design regulations around the world reveals a host of design 
return periods, the origin of which is rarely if ever explained. [One 
set of g]uidelines specify 500 years for “essential” bridges, 2500 years 
for “critical” bridges. In [another] proposal for a framework for 
performance-based seismic design, return periods of 72, 244, 475 and 
 
 96. See Adler, supra note 8, at 1227–32. 
 97. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross et al., Discernible Risk—A Proposed Standard for Significant 
Risk in Carcinogen Regulation, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 61, 78–80 (1991). 
 98. See FLOOD DAMAGE REDUCTION STUDIES, supra note 6, at 142–43. 
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974 years have been specified . . . . It is hard not to feel that some of 
these values have been almost pulled from a hat . . . .99 
E. Do Not Conflate Moral Rights Infringements with Welfare 
Setbacks (Even to Vital Interests) 
Some of the scholarly literature on environmental policy seems 
to take the view that virtually any death or injury resulting from an 
environmental hazard implicates moral rights.100 Such a view is 
problematic. 
Deontological accounts of policymaking face the general 
difficulty of explaining why government has a deontological reason to 
prevent rights infringements by others.101 Very plausibly, if 
government itself builds an inadequate levee without informing the 
exposed population, then it has committed a deontological wrong and 
has a deontological obligation to repair the levee. But consider the 
case in which private developers in Mississippi, knowing of the 
hurricane risk, build inadequate buildings without informing the 
occupants. If Matt Adler, a private citizen of Mississippi, is aware of 
these events but declines to bear private costs to warn the occupants, 
he has not deontologically wronged the occupants. He has simply 
failed to perform the supererogatory action of rescuing them. Why, 
then, is the government of Mississippi or the United States 
deontologically obliged to take steps to help the occupants—thereby 
imposing costs on the private citizens of Mississippi or the United 
States which, individually, they would have no deontological 
obligation to bear? 
This is a general problem, and may well have a satisfying general 
answer. But even if it does, at most the answer would show that 
government has a deontological duty of some kind to stop 
deontological rights violations by private actors. This is not the same 
as a deontological duty to stop all harms. A harm or expected harm—
an actual or expected setback to some aspect of well-being—is not 
sufficient for a rights violation. Harms or expected harms will be 
 
 99. Bommer, supra note 58, at 60–61 (internal citations omitted); see also NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, SAFETY OF DAMS, supra note 59, at 23 (noting use of arbitrary criteria in 
designing dams, such as an arbitrary percentage of the one hundred-year flood or the probable 
maximum flood). 
 100. See, e.g., K.S. SHRADER-FRECHETTE, RISK AND RATIONALITY: PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS FOR POPULIST REFORMS 117–18 (1991). 
 101. See Adler, supra note 8, at 1224–25. 
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rights invasions only if there are wrongdoers. Identifying wrongdoers 
in the case of natural hazards is particularly tricky, because a large 
part of the causal chain leading to harm will be some meteorological 
or seismic event rather than a human action. Of course, humans will 
sometimes be wrongdoers here; humans can wrongfully make others 
more vulnerable to hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, and so on. On the 
other hand, there will be cases—at a minimum, cases where the 
harmed parties knowingly and voluntarily assumed the risk of a 
natural hazard—in which the harm or expected harm of a natural 
hazard violates no rights. 
Specifying these cases more fully involves an account of 
deontological wrongdoing—a controversial matter that I cannot 
engage at any length here.102 But it seems quite clear that all 
deontologists, whatever their particular accounts, would strongly 
resist conflating the category of harm or expected harm (even to a 
very important interest, such as life) with the category of rights 
infringement. 
II.  RISK ASSESSMENT 
The main thrust of Part I was that policy analysis for 
environmental and natural hazards should be welfare-focused, 
multidimensional, and sensitive to population size at some level. 
Policy analysis is welfare-focused if it directly attends to the impact of 
possible policies on human interests, rather than employing some 
proxy criterion. It is multidimensional if it attends to the full range of 
human interests, rather than giving priority to one or a few. It is 
sensitive to population size if it makes reference to the number of 
individuals harmed by hazards. Administrative decision procedures 
that do not fulfill these desiderata may be justifiable, but only on 
institutional grounds, if the procedures are sufficiently accurate in 
tracking overall well-being, equity, and rights, and if the decision costs 
and bureaucratic error rates of welfare-focused, multidimensional, 
and size-sensitive procedures are too high. 
Further, in the case where agencies justifiably employ truncated 
procedures, the locus of welfare-focused, multidimensional, and 
population-size-sensitive decisionmaking is simply shifted to some 
other decisionmaker or advisor: from agencies to Congress or the 
 
 102. For further discussion, see Heidi M. Hurd, What in the World is Wrong?, 5 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 157 (1994). 
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President, or from Congress and the President to governmental 
commissions, think tanks, and scholars. 
These points have much relevance for risk assessment. It is 
critical to develop and maintain risk assessment techniques that can 
subserve welfare-focused, multidimensional, and population-size-
sensitive policy analysis for environmental and natural hazards—if 
not to inform agency decisionmakers, then at least to inform their 
overseers, or the individuals who advise the overseers. Further, risk 
assessments can be more or less simplified—meaning that they may 
ignore relevant scientific data, employ simplified models, or adopt a 
simplified approach to the treatment of uncertainty. Simplified 
assessments may, in principle, be justifiable—on the now-familiar 
grounds of decision cost and bureaucratic error—but should be 
critically scrutinized. 
A. Develop Techniques Suitable for Multidimensional, Population-
Size-Sensitive Policy Analysis 
A risk assessment is a characterization of the harms that an 
environmental or natural hazard can be expected to cause, either in 
the status quo or in the event that various mitigating interventions are 
adopted. Proxy-based policy-analytic criteria may not necessitate a 
risk assessment. Policy-analytic criteria that focus on one dimension 
of well-being will require a risk assessment only with respect to that 
dimension. Policy-analytic criteria that are insensitive to population 
size will not require a risk assessment that estimates the total amount 
of harm caused by a hazard. But, because environmental and natural 
hazards decisionmaking should be welfare-focused, multidimensional, 
and sensitive to population size at some level, risk assessment 
techniques to inform that sort of policy analysis need to be 
maintained and improved. The cautionary lesson, here, is directed at 
the risk assessment community—in effect, at those who maintain a 
certain kind of intellectual capital, namely the scholars who develop 
risk assessment techniques and the agencies or other bodies which 
fund that scholarly work. 
To begin, the safety-focused conception of environmental risk 
assessment needs to be broadened to encompass a fuller range of 
harms. The Red Book framework says that a “risk assessment” means 
“the characterization of the potential adverse health effects of human 
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exposures to [an] environmental hazard[],”103 encompassing a hazard 
identification, a dose-response assessment, and an exposure 
assessment, all leading up to a risk characterization (that is, a 
characterization of individual or population fatality and health risks). 
This remains the standard framework for conceptualizing risk 
assessment of toxins and radiation.104 
It might be thought that this conception is adequate for 
environmental hazards—that non-safety impacts occur as a result of 
policies to mitigate environmental hazards (for example, when 
regulations impose economic costs on shareholders, workers, and 
consumers), rather than being caused by the hazards themselves. This 
is not true: toxins and radiation causally impact a variety of human 
interests other than health and longevity, for example, by causing 
smells, poor visibility, physical damage to property, loss of property 
value, and the degradation of recreational and other “use” values 
attendant upon ecosystem harm. 
In any event, the safety-focused conceptualization, or any 
unidimensional conceptualization, is too narrow for purposes of 
natural hazards risk assessment. As already stated, natural hazards 
causally impact a wide range of human interests, and the natural 
hazards risk assessment community needs to develop models and 
techniques to characterize all those types of impacts. Much work has 
been done on quantifying the economic effects of natural hazards—
both direct property damage and more indirect effects, such as 
business interruption or macroeconomic effects. This includes ACE’s 
efforts and that of many scholars. Substantial scholarly work has also 
been undertaken to estimate the deaths and injuries caused by natural 
hazards.105 “HAZUS,” a computer program for earthquake, 
 
 103. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, 
supra note 3, at 18 (emphasis added). 
 104. See, e.g., Paustenbach, supra note 19, at 7–9; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE 
AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT 4–5 (1994). 
 105. On ACE practices, see supra note 6. For scholarship concerning the estimation of 
losses caused by natural hazards, including economic losses, injuries and casualties and (to some 
extent) other losses as well, see, for example, ECONOMICS AND THE WIND, supra note 40; FED. 
EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, INDIRECT ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF A CATASTROPHIC 
EARTHQUAKE (1992); FLOODS AND LANDSLIDES, supra note 2; NAT’L INST. OF BLDG. SCIS., 
supra note 2; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF A 
CATASTROPHIC EARTHQUAKE (1992); José Badal et al., Preliminary Quantitative Assessment of 
Earthquake Casualties and Damages, 34 NAT. HAZARDS 353 (2005); 13 EARTHQUAKE 
SPECTRA 565 (1997); J.W. Hall et al., A Methodology for National-Scale Flood Risk Assessment, 
156 WATER & MAR. ENGINEERING 235 (2003); Penning-Rowsell et al., supra note 79. 
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hurricane, and flood risk assessment developed by FEMA for 
distribution to states, localities, and the private sector, allows some 
estimation of physical damage (“damage to residential and 
commercial buildings, schools, critical facilities, and infrastructure”), 
economic loss (“lost jobs, business interruptions, repair and 
reconstruction costs”), and certain “social impacts” (“estimates for 
shelter requirements,” “displaced households” and casualties).106 Risk 
assessment techniques to quantify a broader range of “social impacts” 
of natural hazards—such as psychological trauma, destruction of 
cultural heritage, family separation, or the disruption of schooling—
would also be useful.107 
A second cautionary lesson concerns population-size 
insensitivity. Particular policy-analytic criteria may ignore some 
welfare dimension entirely, or may attend to that dimension in a size-
insensitive manner (for example, through an “individual risk” test). 
But, ideally, risk assessment techniques should be available to predict 
aggregate losses with respect to the variety of welfare dimensions that 
environmental and natural hazards do causally impact. 
Risk assessment of noncarcinogens dramatically illustrates the 
point. Because these substances have been thought to possess a 
threshold below which no harm will ensue, risk assessment techniques 
here have been traditionally focused on estimating that threshold—
specifically, on identifying the NOAEL—and not on providing 
quantitative estimates of “individual risk” or total deaths. 
For many years, there has been a fundamental dichotomy in risk 
assessment. Since the 1970s, the potential carcinogenic hazards of 
chemicals have generally been characterized by quantitative 
estimates of the increased lifetime risk of cancer associated with a 
given exposure. On the other hand, the potential hazards of 
chemicals for toxic endpoints other than cancer have generally been 
 
 106. HAZUS: FEMA’s Software Program for Estimating Potential Losses from Disasters, 
supra note 7. The precise capabilities of HAZUS depend on whether the hazard being 
evaluated is an earthquake, flood or hurricane. FEMA’s web site, supra, provides links that 
describe the earthquake, flood and hurricane components of HAZUS. 
 107. ACE’s report on the impact of Katrina is a good step in this direction. In addition to 
characterizing the economic consequences, human health and safety consequences, and 
environmental consequences of the hurricane, it also characterizes social and cultural 
consequences. See generally 7 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, supra note 82. 
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characterized only by the specification of an exposure level 
considered to be without appreciable risk . . . .108 
The upshot is that no consensus technique currently exists for 
estimating the total deaths or diseases caused by exposures to 
noncarcinogens.109 
This lacuna in risk assessment techniques does not undermine 
certain policy-analytic criteria. For example, the estimation of the 
NOAEL is sufficient information for a decisionmaker who seeks to 
reduce the exposure of the maximally exposed individual to a level 
equaling the NOAEL divided by some safety factor. But the lacuna 
does undermine cost-benefit analysis or other criteria that do require 
information about total deaths or diseases. “[W]ithout readily 
available means for quantifying noncancer risks, the focus [in cost-
benefit analysis] is often solely on cancer risks, while noncancer 
health risks are ignored.”110 A good example is EPA’s cost-benefit 
analysis for arsenic under the Safe Drinking Water Act. Arsenic at 
low doses causes bladder and liver cancer, and also life-threatening 
noncancer effects such as ischemic heart disease (ISHD). EPA 
quantified the cancer reduction benefits of lowering the level of 
arsenic in drinking water, but not the reduction in noncancer effects—
even though it appears that “the mortality risk of ISHD from drinking 
water may be greater than the mortality risk from cancer.”111 The 
agency’s “failure to quantify the noncancer effects of arsenic appears 
to result from the fact that there is not a generally accepted practice, 
or expectation, of performing low-dose extrapolation for noncancer 
endpoints.”112 
Fortunately, the NOAEL example appears to have no analogue 
in natural hazards risk assessment. There appears to be no general 
resistance to estimating aggregate effects with respect to some kind of 
harm. 
 
 108. Harvey J. Clewell & Kenny S. Crump, Quantitative Estimates of Risk for Noncancer 
Endpoints, 25 RISK ANALYSIS 285, 285 (2005). 
 109. See id. at 288. 
 110. Id. at 285. 
 111. Id. at 287. 
 112. Id. Another context in which NOAEL-type information would be inadequate is an 
emergency response agency’s choice among different responses to a widespread toxic exposure. 
Information about expected casualties would be crucial for this choice. See generally Kenneth T. 
Bogen, Risk Analysis for Environmental Health Triage, 25 RISK ANALYSIS 1085 (2005). 
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B. Do Not Exclude Relevant Information (AGIR) 
Predicting the harm caused by a toxin or radiation means 
combining an exposure assessment (describing how much of the toxin 
or radiation various individuals receive) and a dose-response 
assessment (predicting the incremental “individual risk” for a given 
dose and a given type of individual). Environmental agencies have 
often excluded relevant information at both these stages of risk 
assessment. 
First, at the exposure assessment stage, environmental agencies 
tend to ignore some relevant social science data. The exposure of 
humans to a dangerous substance contained in a waste dump or 
emitted by a factory or nuclear plant depends not merely on hard 
science (the physical laws governing the transport of the substance 
through the air, ground, and water) but also on demographics (the 
number of humans present at various distances from the dump, 
factory, or plant). This is, of course, a point that environmental 
agencies have recognized; but their demographic and, more generally, 
social-scientific models have often been quite simplistic. For example, 
a comprehensive review by the National Research Council of EPA’s 
risk assessment techniques for air pollutants reached the following 
conclusion: 
  EPA has not previously used population activity, population 
mobility, and demographics in modeling exposure to hazardous air 
pollutants and has not adequately evaluated the effects of assuming 
that the population of a census enumeration district is all at the 
location of the district’s population center. 
  EPA should use population-activity models in exposure 
assessments when there is reason to believe that the exposure 
estimate might be inaccurate . . . if the default option is applied. This 
is particularly important in the case of potential underestimation of 
risk. Population mobility and demographics will also play a role in 
determining risk and lifetime exposures.113 
Second, at the dose-response assessment stage, environmental 
agencies tend to ignore personal characteristics. A repeated theme in 
commission reports and the academic literature is that environmental 
agencies should consider employing dose-response models that reflect 
 
 113. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra 
note 104, at 139. 
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heterogeneity in individual susceptibility to toxins—be it because of 
age, gender, health history, or identifiable genetic factors.114 
Ignoring relevant data is one way to simplify risk assessment. 
Simplification has potential benefits (in lower decision costs and 
bureaucratic error), but also costs (in producing inaccurate risk 
assessments). Those who design agency risk assessment techniques, 
and the scholars who advise the designers, need to try to balance 
these costs and benefits. Substantial scholarly commentary suggests 
that the risk assessment techniques currently employed by 
environmental agencies are unjustifiably abstemious in their use of 
relevant data.115 
Social science data is, of course, crucial to natural hazards risk 
assessment. The term often used in the literature is population 
“vulnerability”: earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, droughts, tornadoes, 
and avalanches harm humans because of an interaction between a 
natural event and a human population that is “vulnerable,” to some 
extent, to that event. Vulnerability is a matter of social, not physical, 
science. And, just as individuals are heterogeneous in their 
susceptibility to toxins, so they are heterogeneous in their 
vulnerability to natural hazards—a point that the natural hazards 
literature stresses. 
  A major approach to hazards research over the past two decades 
has looked at the way in which a variety of socioeconomic 
characteristics of people affect . . . their vulnerability to hazards and 
disasters over time. . . . 
  In the United States the key characteristics that seem to influence 
disaster vulnerability most are socioeconomic status, gender, and 
race or ethnicity. Differences in these characteristics result in a 
complicated system of stratification of wealth, power, and status. 
This stratification, in turn, results in an uneven distribution of 
exposure and vulnerability to hazards, disaster losses, and other 
 
 114. See, e.g., id. at 188–223; Adler, supra note 8, at 1145 n.86 (citing sources). 
 115. See, e.g., 2 THE PRESIDENTIAL/CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON RISK ASSESSMENT 
AND RISK MANAGEMENT, RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT IN REGULATORY 
DECISION-MAKING 71–85 (1997); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN 
RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 104, at 138–40, 218–19; Adam M. Finkel, A Quantitative Estimate 
of the Variations in Human Susceptibility to Cancer and Its Implications for Risk Management, in 
LOW-DOSE EXTRAPOLATION OF CANCER RISKS: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 297 (Stephen Olin 
et al. eds., 1995); Lauren Zeise et al., Improving Risk Assessment: Research Opportunities in 
Dose Response Modeling to Improve Risk Assessment, 8 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK 
ASSESSMENT 1421, 1423–30 (2002). 
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impacts and access to aid, recovery, and reconstruction. For 
example, the poor are more likely to occupy old and more 
hazardous housing, ethnic minorities are less likely to receive 
disaster warnings and are more likely to have language barriers to 
the information they receive, and developing nations are less able to 
afford disaster detection technology and resilient construction 
practices.116 
Worries about undue simplification are just as relevant for 
natural hazards as for environmental risk assessment. An important 
example involves the endogeneity of human activity to risk reduction 
measures. Salient measures to decrease the impacts of a natural 
hazard in some location, such as levees or other visible structural 
measures, can reduce the perceived risks in that location and thus 
induce increased settlement or building. Individuals may respond to 
enhanced government protection from natural hazards with 
“compensatory” behaviors that reduce the protection, thereby 
producing a smaller reduction in death, property loss, and other harm 
than would occur absent “compensation.”117 ACE needs to be 
sensitive to these points in undertaking cost-benefit analyses of flood 
reduction measures.118 
C. Use Probabilistic Rather than Deterministic Risk Assessment 
(AGIR) 
The models, parameters, and other inputs that the risk assessor 
uses to predict the impacts of environmental and natural hazards—on 
safety or other human interests—will typically be uncertain.119 
Bracketing institutional considerations, this uncertainty should be 
represented through a probability distribution.120 An alternative is to 
use a “point value” for the uncertain input: for example, picking the 
 
 116. MILETI, supra note 5, at 122–23. 
 117. See Nicole Cornell Sadowski & Daniel Sutter, Natural Hazards, Fatality Rates and 
Societal Vulnerability, in ECONOMICS AND THE WIND, supra note 40, at 149. 
 118. Cf. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 6, at 55–59 (discussing ACE’s traditional 
preference for structural rather than nonstructural flood control measures); WATER 
RESOURCES PLANNING, supra note 6, at 61–63 (same). 
 119. On uncertainty and risk assessment, see, for example, VINCENT T. COVELLO & MILEY 
W. MERKHOFER, RISK ASSESSMENT METHODS: APPROACHES FOR ASSESSING HEALTH AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS 203–37 (1993); Pamela R.D. Williams & Dennis J. Paustenbach, Risk 
Characterization, in HUMAN AND ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 4, at 336, 336–45. 
 120. See, e.g., Dennis J. Paustenbach, Retrospective on U.S. Health Risk Assessment: How 
Others Can Benefit, 6 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV’T 283, 318–19 (1995). 
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most likely model, or the mean of a model parameter. The problem 
with this approach is twofold. First, using “point values” rather than 
probability distributions as inputs to risk assessments suppresses some 
of the uncertainty about the output of the assessment, thereby 
depriving the policy analyst of information that may be useful.121 For 
example, imagine that the total deaths D from an earthquake in a 
given location is a function of X, Y, and Z. If X, Y, and Z are all 
assigned point values equaling their means, then D = F(X, Y, Z) is a 
point value too.122 Uncertainty about the distribution of D is not 
communicated to the decisionmaker. This may well be relevant 
information, depending on how the policy-analytic criterion is 
structured. For example, it is conceivable that overall welfare, and 
policy-analytic criteria that implement overall welfare, are not “risk-
neutral” in the number of deaths. A very-low-probability, very-high-
consequence earthquake that has a 0.01 percent annual probability 
and would cause one million deaths may be worse for expected 
overall welfare (and merit greater ex ante mitigation efforts) than a 
higher-probability, lower-consequence earthquake that has a 10 
percent annual probability and would cause one thousand deaths, 
even though both seismic hazards have the same expected number of 
annual deaths (one hundred). 
Second, even if the policy-analytic criteria are risk-neutral in the 
output of the risk assessment—so that the output distribution can, 
without loss of relevant information, be summarized as its expected 
value—using point values rather than probability distributions as 
inputs to the risk assessment may generate incorrect results.123 
Although it is true that the expectation of the sum of random 
variables is the sum of their expectations, it is not generally true that 
the expectation of some arbitrary function of random variables is that 
function applied to their expectations. 
Indeed, so-called “probabilistic” risk assessment—which 
characterizes uncertainties in inputs and outputs using probability 
distributions, as opposed to “deterministic” assessment, which uses 
point estimates—has been the focus of much scholarly work in recent 
 
 121. See Judson Jaffe & Robert N. Stavins, On the Value of Formal Assessment of 
Uncertainty in Regulatory Analysis (Feb. 2006), at 8–11 (on file with the Duke Law Journal).  
 122. And if X is assigned a point value equaling its mean, but Y and Z are represented as 
random variables, the probability distribution of D may not be the same as if X were also 
represented as a random variable. 
 123. See Jaffe & Stavins, supra note 121, at 8–11. 
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years. However, environmental agencies have often been resistant to 
“probabilistic” risk assessment. An exemplary case is EPA’s 
treatment of model uncertainty in drawing dose-response curves for 
carcinogens. Many substances are possible rather than clear 
carcinogens, given existing epidemiological and experimental 
evidence. In other words, there is a nontrivial probability that they 
cause cancer but also a nontrivial probability that they don’t—that 
their dose-response curves are flat lines. And, even if carcinogenicity 
is quite clear, there may be much uncertainty about which particular 
form the dose-response relationship takes. EPA has traditionally 
refrained from quantifying uncertainty about carcinogenicity and 
about the dose-response functional form. Instead, its approach has 
been to use one particular model (the linearized multistage model) 
for predicting fatalities from toxins that, as a qualitative mater, are 
judged sufficiently likely to be carcinogens.124 
Natural hazards risk assessment should, to some extent, employ 
“probabilistic” rather than “deterministic” techniques. Indeed, ACE 
has been considerably more receptive to “probabilistic” risk 
assessment than EPA.125 To be sure, decision costs remain an 
important reason for limiting the use of probabilistic techniques. It 
may well be cheaper to estimate a point value for some input than to 
trace a probability distribution. On the other hand, advances in 
computers and software—in particular, the development of so-called 
Monte Carlo techniques—have made it much easier to determine the 
output of “probabilistic” risk assessments, i.e., to determine the 
probability distribution that results from any given function of input 
random variables. Further, as Judson Jaffe and Robert Stavins 
observe: 
[C]haracterizations of uncertainty may be necessary just to develop 
an accurate point estimate for an input. If a point estimate 
represents an input’s expected value, the development of that point 
estimate requires an implicit judgment about that input’s probability 
distribution. Characterizations of uncertainty . . . simply make those 
implicit judgments explicit.126 
 
 124. On EPA practices, see Adler, supra note 8, at 1148 n.91 (citing sources). The possibility 
of quantifying model uncertainty is an important theme in the literature on Bayesian 
approaches to risk assessment. See id. at 1209 & n.330. 
 125. See sources cited supra note 6; Moser, supra note 59; U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, 
supra note 80. 
 126. Jaffe & Stavins, supra note 121, at 18. 
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Because estimating a point value of some item given uncertainty 
always involves some kind of probabilistic assessment, if only 
qualitative or implicit rather than quantitative and explicit, the 
incremental decision costs of a quantitative representation will often 
not be large. Professors Jaffe and Stavins’ observation also suggests 
that “probabilistic” risk assessment may actually be less subject to 
agency manipulation. Explicitly articulating a probability distribution 
would seem to be more transparent to agency overseers than making 
a judgment about the mean or most likely value of an item without 
articulating the distribution. 
A different reason for the traditional resistance to “probabilistic” 
risk assessment goes deep into the theory of probability and statistics. 
Traditional statistical methods are “frequentist” rather than 
“Bayesian.” They refuse to employ probabilities as measures of 
beliefs; instead, probabilities are seen as solely representing objective 
frequencies. On this view, it would be appropriate to represent the 
occurrence of cancer in an individual as a random variable. With 
some objective long-run frequency, individuals exposed to a given 
dose of a toxin develop cancer—a frequency that can be estimated 
using sampling techniques. On the other hand, traditional statisticians 
would refuse to assign a probability to one or another model of 
carcinogenicity. Imagine that the risk assessor is unsure whether the 
toxin produces cancer by means of genotoxicity or some other 
mechanism. Because there is no objective frequency here—in reality, 
the substance is either genotoxic or not—attaching a “probability” to 
genotoxicity is meaningless on the frequentist account. 
For reasons I have explored at length elsewhere, an exclusively 
frequentist account of probability is problematic in the domain of 
policy analysis.127 Beliefs, like objective frequencies, can be quantified 
probabilistically. Further, beliefs (and not just objective frequencies) 
are a crucial input to risk assessment. The notion of using merely 
frequency information to make predictions is chimerical. For 
example, EPA’s dose-response procedures combine frequency data 
(the frequency with which rats exposed to different doses of a 
substance incur cancer) and expert beliefs (the belief that the 
substance is a likely carcinogen and that, based on all the evidence to 
date, the linearized multistage model is a plausible model of dose-
 
 127. See Adler, supra note 8, at 1183–239. 
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response relationships). So expert beliefs are part of the picture—they 
are simply not represented probabilistically. 
To be sure, in some cases, experts may disagree, or may have 
difficulty expressing their uncertainty as a probability distribution. 
These phenomena represent a kind of decision cost, which may well 
argue for “deterministic” rather than “probabilistic” approaches for 
handling particular uncertain items. The point I wish to make is that 
risk assessors should not be globally resistant to employing 
probabilities as measures of beliefs. However appropriate a wholly 
frequentist approach to probability and statistics may be for scientific 
inquiry, it is too abstemious for policy analysis. 
D. Do Not Adopt a Global Posture of “Conservatism” in Handling 
Uncertainty 
EPA has historically employed a “conservative” approach to risk 
assessment. 
The agency’s [risk assessment principles] are for the most part 
intended to be conservative—that is, they represent an implicit 
choice by the agency, in dealing with competing plausible 
assumptions, to use (as default options) the assumptions that lead to 
risk estimates that, although plausible, are believed to be more likely 
to overestimate than to underestimate the risk to human health and 
the environment. EPA’s risk estimates thus are intended to reflect 
the upper region of the range of risks suggested by current scientific 
knowledge.128 
One well-known example is the use of the linearized multistage dose-
response model, which is linear at low doses (rather than being 
sublinear or having a threshold) and is “one of the most conservative 
of the dose extrapolation models.”129 Another is EPA’s frequent use 
of an upper bound estimate on the slope of this line, rather than the 
maximum likelihood estimate, as the number employed to generate 
predictions of individual and population risks.130 Other important 
examples are the assumptions that “[h]umans are as sensitive as the 
most sensitive animal species, strain, or sex evaluated in a bioassay”; 
 
 128. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra 
note 104, at 89. 
 129. Williams & Paustenbach, supra note 119, at 313. 
 130. See Lorenz R. Rhomberg, A Survey of Methods for Chemical Health Risk Assessment 
Among Federal Regulatory Method Agencies, 3 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 1029, 
1100–02 (1997). 
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that “benign and malignant tumors are added in evaluating whether a 
chemical is carcinogenic and in assessing its potency”; and that 
“[w]hen extrapolating metabolic data from laboratory animals to 
humans, one may use the relationship of surface area [not body 
weight] in the test species to that in humans in modifying the 
laboratory animal data.”131 
In thinking about “conservatism,” it is important to distinguish 
between “conservatism” at the level of policy analysis and 
“conservatism” in the preparation of risk assessments. Policy-analytic 
techniques, themselves, may be justifiably “conservative,” in the sense 
that they may appropriately incorporate an ancillary instruction to 
handle uncertainty about inputs by employing conservative rather 
than central-tendency estimates. It is hard to see why this would be 
true of cost-benefit analysis, but it may be true of other criteria. For 
example, it is possible that institutional considerations justify natural 
hazards agencies in employing criteria that make reference to 
extreme events: “Ensure that building codes prevent collapse except 
in the 475-year earthquake,” or “Build levees to prevent flooding in 
cities except in the probable maximum flood.” Those same 
institutional considerations could, in principle, mean that the agency 
is justifiably instructed to employ upper bound estimates in estimating 
the size of the extreme event or the adequacy of measures to contain 
it. Why assume that the appropriate instruction is “Design a structure 
that has a 0.50 probability of surviving the X-year flood or 
earthquake,” rather than “Design a structure that has a 0.95 
probability of surviving the X-year flood or earthquake”? 
It is therefore difficult to make general statements about the 
appropriate degree of conservatism for policy-analytic criteria. By 
contrast, the question of the appropriate conservatism of risk 
assessment is easier to resolve. If uncertainty about an input item is 
represented probabilistically, as a random variable, the answer seems 
easy: use Monte Carlo techniques to combine this input random 
variable with other inputs, producing an output probability 
distribution (of total deaths, property loss, trauma, and so forth) 
 
 131. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra 
note 104, at 88–89. 
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which the policy-analytic technique can incorporate together with 
whatever rule for handling uncertainty it employs.132 
The more difficult issue arises when uncertainty about some 
input isn’t represented probabilistically—when a “point estimate” 
rather than a probability distribution for that input is used. Here, we 
should distinguish between the case where a risk assessment of a 
hazard is performed apart from any particular policy choice, and the 
case where it is performed as part and parcel of policy analysis. In the 
latter case, the answer to whether point estimates should be 
“conservative” or rather central tendencies (or, for that matter, anti-
conservative) is straightforward: use whichever approach the policy-
analytic technique demands. In the former case, risk assessment is 
meant to provide generic information, for a variety of policy choices 
and policy-analytic techniques—so the answer here is that risk 
assessment should not merely use conservative values. It should also 
inform the analyst what the hazard impact (or probability distribution 
of impacts) would be if the point estimate for the input item were 
estimated less conservatively. 
In short, although the issues turn out to be complicated, it seems 
clear that natural hazards risk assessment should eschew a general 
preference for “conservative” estimates of the size of natural hazards 
and of their impact on humans. The problem of conservatism can be 
sidestepped by using probability distributions rather than point values 
for uncertain quantities; and when point values are justifiably 
employed (given decision costs), a global posture of estimating them 
“conservatively” will produce risk assessments that are not useful for 
policy-analytic criteria, such as cost-benefit analysis, that prefer 
central-tendency estimates. 
CONCLUSION 
Environmental risk assessment and management is, in many 
ways, an impressive accomplishment, but should not be reflexively 
duplicated by natural hazards policymakers. This Article has 
attempted to delineate the most important aspects of environmental 
agencies’ decisionmaking practices that are problematic, or at least 
demand an institutional justification—one that examines the decision 
 
 132. See Paustenbach, supra note 120, at 310 (“[T]he problems associated with the repeated 
use of overly conservative assumptions . . . can now be overcome with Monte Carlo 
techniques.”). 
01__ADLER.DOC 11/14/2006  8:29 AM  
50 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:1 
costs, bureaucratic error rates, and accuracy (in tracking underlying 
moral considerations) associated with different possible policy-
analytic criteria. The suggestions here are supposed to be relatively 
uncontroversial. They are meant to proceed from a relatively broad-
gauged moral framework—weak welfarism—which has room for 
distributive considerations and moral rights, as well as overall well-
being. Still, even placing to one side controversial moral questions 
and difficult problems of optimal institutional design, it seems 
possible to glean certain nontrivial cautionary lessons for natural 
hazards policy analysis and risk assessment from the environmental 
case. To summarize: 
For Natural Hazards Policy Analysis 
• Do Not Give Priority to Safety or Any Particular Aspect of 
Well-Being (AGIR)133 
• Do Not Use Proxy Tests (AGIR) 
• Do Not Ignore Population Size (AGIR) 
• Do Not Use Arbitrary Non-Zero Numerical Cutoffs 
• Do Not Conflate Moral Rights Infringements with Welfare 
Setbacks (Even to Vital Interests) 
For Natural Hazards Risk Assessment 
• Develop Techniques Suitable for Multidimensional, 
Population-Size-Sensitive Policy Analysis 
• Do Not Exclude Relevant Information (AGIR) 
• Use Probabilistic Rather than Deterministic Risk 
Assessment (AGIR) 
• Do Not Adopt a Global Posture of “Conservatism” in 
Handling Uncertainty 
 
 133 “AGIR,” again, means “absent good institutional reason.” See supra text 
accompanying note 36 (discussing role of institutional considerations in justifying policy-analytic 
criteria). 
